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Chapter 1
Introduction
This report is concerned with the development and the formal specification and ver-
ification of a fault-masking and transient-recovery model appropriate to the repli-
cated computers in digital flight-control systems (DFCS). The culmination of the
verification is a mechanically checked theorem which establishes, subject to certain
carefully stated assumptions, that faults among the component computers of the
DFCS will be masked--so that the commands sent to the actuators will be the
same as those that would be sent by a single computer that suffers no failures.
In order to make this report accessible to those unfamiliar with fault-tolerant
process-control systems, we begin this chapter with a brief exposition of DFCS,
and then present the rationale for the particular model that is the focus of our
formal investigation. (See [1] for a full treatment of digital avionics systems, [2] for
a treatment of general validation issues, and [3] for a description of current practice
in the verification and validation of software for DFCS.)
The second chapter presents the model formally, in the manner of a conventional
mathematical development. The proof of the fault-masking and transient-recovery
theorem is presented in the same way.
The third chapter outlines the fully formal specification of the model, and its
mechanically checked verification. These were undertaken using the EHDM formal
specification and verification system [4-8]; the Elt DM specification text and related
material are given in the Appendices.
The fourth chapter discusses the relationship between the model employed here
and the similar one developed by Di Vito, Butler, and Caldwell of NASA Langley
Research Center [9, 10]. The fifth and final chapter presents our conclusions and
recommendations for further work.
2 Chapter1. Introduction
1.1 Digital Flight-Control Systems
Increasingly, modern aircraft rely on Digital Flight-Control Systems--computer sys-
tems that interpret the pilot's control inputs and send appropriate commands to the
control surfaces and engines) Depending on the aircraft design, DFCS may manage
all, or merely some, of the control surfaces and may or may not have back-up sys-
tems comprising either analog computers or conventional mechanical and hydraulic
systems. The advantages claimed for DFCS include the following:
Safety: DFCS can prevent the pilot stalling the plane, or otherwise taking it be-
yond its control envelope. For example, the F16 provides yaw-rate limitation
to prevent the aircraft entering a certain flat spin mode that has "unaccept-
able recovery," and rudder fade-out to ensure that "pilots could not get in
trouble because of flying habits developed in other aircraft" [11]. Similarly,
the Airbus A320 DFCS provides "stall/windshear protection and protection
also against overspeed and overstress ... the A320's system automatically pre-
vents the aircraft leaving its safe-flight envelope at any point, whether pilot
error or incompetence, engine malfunction, or the elements have brought it
to that point" [12] (but see also [13]). Other contributions to safety may in-
clude reduction in pilot workload through increased automation and improved
handling.
Economy and performance: Elimination of heavy hydraulic and mechanical
control linkages reduces aircraft weight and thereby improves fuel-efficiency
and load-carrying capacity [14]. Optimum control of engine thrust and angle
of attack can also reduce fuel consumption significantly.
Efficiency and performance can sometimes be gained at the expense of han-
dling qualities. DFCS can restore neutral handling characteristics to such
aircraft. Maneuverability in unusual flight regimes (e.g., post-stall) may re-
quire complex transformations between command inputs and actuator outputs
that can only be achieved by computer control. For example, roll commands
in the X31 at high angles of attack are interpreted relative to the velocity
vector, not the longitudinal axis of the aircraft. Thus at 90 ° angle of attack,
a pure roll command translates to a pure yaw in the body axis [15]. In the
limit, high maneuverability, stealth, or other requirements for military aircraft
may best be achieved with an unstable airplane--which will require computer
control in order to fly at all.
1The popular term fly-by-wire (FBW) covers both DFCS and similar, earlier, systems that
employ analog computers. Fly-by-light is simply FBW in which fiber-optic cables replace the
copper wires used to route signals around the aircraft.
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Damage control: The loss of a control surface or engine sometimes results in a
crash, not because the airplane is absolutely uncontrollable, but because its
pilot is unable to learn how to control it in the time available. For example,
it is very hard to control a twin-engined light plane if one of the engines fails,
and private pilots often crash in this circumstance. A DFCS can partially
compensate for the massive change in flying characteristics caused by failure
or damage and thereby assist the pilot to make a safe landing. Simulations
have been performed to investigate the efficacy of such systems for military
aircraft suffering battle damage [16].
The perceived advantages of DFCS are such that they are employed in almost
all modern high-performance western military aircraft. Modern western passenger
aircraft generally have full-authority digital engine controls (FADEC); digital au-
topilot, autolander, and flight management system; and digital control of secondary
surfaces and functions, such as air brakes, spoilers, yaw damping, and gust allevia-
tion. However, the Airbus A320 is the only passenger aircraft in service with a full
DFCS--that is, one controlling primary control surfaces in the pitch and roll axes. 2
Forthcoming passenger aircraft such as the Boeing 777 will also employ comprehen-
sive DFCS.
The greater the benefit provided by DFCS, the less plausible it becomes to
provide adequate back-up systems employing different technologies. For example,
the DFCS of an experimental version of the F16 fighter (the "Advanced Fighter
Technology Integration" or AFTI-F16) provides control in flight regimes beyond
the capability of the simpler analog back-up system. Extending the capability of
the back-up system to the full flight envelope of the DFCS would add considerably
to its complexity--and it is the very simplicity of that analog system that is its
chief source of credibility as a back-up system [17]. Similarly, direct manual control
of flight surfaces is unlikely to be available if elimination of heavy mechanical and
hydraulic systems was a primary reason for installing DFCS in the first place. Thus,
the Airbus A320 has mechanical links to only the rudder and the elevator trim-
tab [14, 18] and is given no certification credit for these back-up systems by the
FAA.
1.2 Fault Tolerance for DFCS
It is clear that extreme reliability must be required of DFCS. A much-quoted figure
is a requirement for passenger aircraft that the probability of catastrophic failure
during a 10 hour flight should be less than 10 -9 per hour [19]. Such reliabilities
are beyond those that can be guaranteed for individual digital devices. Not only
2The Concorde, which received FAA certification in 1969, has analog FBW with mechanical
backup in all three primary axes.
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must occasional latent manufacturing defects and the effects of aging be considered,
but also environmental hazards such as power-supply surges, lightning strikes, and
cosmic rays (which can cause single-event-upsets, or SEUs). These factors conspire
to yield an overall reliability well below that required. It follows that some form of
fault tolerance based on replication and redundancy is needed in order to achieve
an underlying "hardware platform" of the required reliability. There are many
configurations for redundant and replicated computer systems, and careful reliability
analysis is required to evaluate the reliability provided by a given configuration and
level of redundancy [20]. Such analyses show that suitably constructed N-modularly
redundant systems (which we will call N-plexes for brevity) can achieve the desired
reliability.
Within an N-plex, all calculations are performed by N identical computer sys-
tems and the results are submitted to some form of averaging or voting. Great care
must be taken to eliminate single-point failures, so the separate computer systems
(or "channels," as they are often called in fault-tolerant systems) will generally use
different power supplies and be otherwise electrically and physically isolated as far
as possible. Notice, however, that there is no protection against design faults: any
such faults in either the hardware or the software will be common to all members
of the N-plex and all will fail together. In this report, we do not address the is-
sue of design faults in the hardware, nor in the application software that it runs.
We are, however, very much concerned with the possibility of design faults in the
redundancy-management software that harnesses the failure-prone individual com-
ponents together as a fault-tolerant N-plex. There is evidence (see page 8) that
redundancy management is sufficiently complex and difficult that it can become the
primary source of unreliability in a DFCS.
The function performed by a DFCS is basically one of process control, as por-
trayed in Figure 1.1. The goal is to control the airplane in flight under command
of the pilot. Information about the state of the airplane, which is subject to exter-
nal disturbances, is obtained through sensors, and control is exercised by sending
commands to actuators. The basic structure of most process-control software is
very similar: the software performs a repetitive cycle of sampling sensors and con-
trol inputs, using control laws to calculate the required actuator response and then
sending appropriate commands to the actuators. The complete cycle is generally
broken into individual "frames," each attending to a particular dimension of con-
trol: for example, one frame may deal with pitch-control--sampling the appropriate
sensors, computing the necessary corrections, and sending commands to the eleva-
tors; another frame may deal with roll, still another with navigation, and so on.
Some variables may need more rapid control than others, so that a complete cycle
might contain four pitch-control frames, two roll frames, and only a single naviga-
tion frame. This general pattern of activity is described as a multi-rate periodic
schedule.
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Disturbances
Airplane
Actuators Sensors
DFCS I
Pilot Commands
Figure 1.1: The DFCS Process-Control Loop
Each frame will perform several computational activities: sampling sensors, eval-
uating control laws, generating control outputs, performing self-tests, and so on.
"Tasks" are the primitive computational elements within this structure: they are
the individual units of activity that may be scheduled and executed. The schedul-
ing slots within a frame and to which individual tasks may be allocated are called
"subframes." Thus, for example, the subframes within a pitch-control frame may
be allocated to several sensor-sampling tasks, an averaging task to integrate the
readings of redundant sensors, a control law task, and an actuator-output task.
Many refinements are possible within this basic paradigm. For example, there
may be a fixed, static, schedule of frames, so that all cycles are identical; alterna-
tively, frames may be scheduled dynamically, depending on external circumstances.
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Similarly, frames may all execute for a common fixed duration, or may have different
durations; they may always execute to completion, or may be subject to preemption,
and so on. Whether task scheduling for critical real-time systems should be static or
dynamic is a controversial issue. Proponents of static schedules point to Richards'
anomalies [21,22], in which the early completion of one task can cause another to be
late, and other difficulties in dynamic scheduling as indications that the predictabil-
ity required for hard real-time systems is best achieved by static scheduling.
The major challenge in the design of a fault-tolerant N-plex for DFCS is one of
redundancy management. Instead of a single computer executing the DFCS soft-
ware, there will be several, which must coordinate and vote (or average) actuator
commands, 3 and tolerate faults among their own members. In addition to the repli-
cated computers, sensors and actuators will be replicated also. The management of
all this redundancy and replication adds considerable complexity to both the oper-
ating system (generally called an "executive" in process-control systems) and the
application tasks. Complexity is a source of design faults, and there is a distinct
possibility that such a large quantity of additional code may lessen, rather than
enhance, overall reliability. The goal of the research program, of which this work is
a component, is to develop principled, structured, and formally specified and ver-
ified approaches to the design and implementation of redundancy management in
DFCS [9].
A plausibly simple approach to redundancy management in an N-plex is the
"asynchronous" design, in which the channels run fairly independently of each other:
each computer samples sensors independently, evaluates the control laws indepen-
dently, and sends its actuator commands to an averaging or selection component
that chooses the value to send to the actuator concerned. The triplex-redundant
DFCS of the experimental AFTI-F16 was built this way, and its flight tests reveal
some of the shortcomings of the approach [17,23].
First, because the unsynchronized individual computers may sample sensors at
slightly different times, they can obtain readings that differ quite appreciably from
one another. The gain in the control laws can amplify these input differences to
provide even larger differences in the results submitted to the output selection al-
gorithm. During ground qualification of the AFTI-F16, it was found that these
differences sometimes resulted in a channel being declared failed when no real fail-
ure had occurred [24, p. 478]. 4 Accordingly, rather a wide spread of values must
be accepted by the threshold algorithms that determine whether sensor inputs and
actuator outputs are to be considered "good." For example, the output thresholds
3Voting or averaging is often performed directly by the actuators, through some form of "force-
summing." For example, different channels may energize separate coils of a single solenoid, or
multiple hydraulic pistons may be linked to a single shaft [11, Figure 3.2-2].
4Also, in the flight tests of the X31 the control system "went into a reversionary mode four times
in the first nine flights, usually due to disagreement between the two air data sources" [15].
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of the AFTI-F16 were set at 15% plus the rate of change of the variable concerned;
also the gains in the control laws were reduced. This increases the latency for de-
tection of faulty sensors and channels, and also allows a failing sensor to drag the
value of any averaging functions quite a long way before it is excluded by the input
selection threshold; at that point, the average will change with a thump [23, Figure
20] that could have adverse effects on the handling of the aircraft.
The danger of wide sensor selection thresholds is dramatically illustrated by a
problem discovered in the X29A. This aircraft has three sources of air data: a nose
probe and two side probes. The selection algorithm used the data from the nose
probe provided it was within some threshold of the data from both side probes.
The threshold was large to accommodate position errors in certain flight modes.
It was subsequently discovered that if the nose probe failed to zero at low speed,
it would still be within the threshold of correct readings, causing the aircraft to
become unstable and "depart." This error was found in simulation, but 162 frights
had been at risk before it was detected [25].
An even more serious shortcoming of asynchronous systems arises when the
control laws contain decision points. Here, sensor noise and sampling skew may
cause independent channels to take different paths at the decision points and to
produce widely divergent outputs. This occurred on Flight 44 of the AFTI-F16
flight tests [23, p. 44]. Each channel declared the others failed; the analog back-
up was not selected because the simultaneous failure of two channels had not been
anticipated and the aircraft was flown home on a single digital channel. Notice that
all protective redundancy had been lost, and the aircraft was flown home in a mode
for which it had not been designed--yet no hardware failure had occurred.
Another illustration is provided by a 3-second "departure" on Flight 36 of the
AFTI-F16 flight tests, during which sideslip exceeded 20 °, normal acceleration ex-
ceeded first -4g, then +7g, angle of attack went to -10 °, then +20 °, the aircraft
rolled 360 °, the vertical tail exceeded design load, all control surfaces were oper-
ating at rate limits, and failure indications were received from the hydraulics and
canard actuators. The problem was traced to an error in the control laws, but sub-
sequent analysis showed that the side air data probe was blanked by the canard at
the high angle of attack and sideslip achieved during the excursion; the wide input
threshold passed the incorrect value through and different channels took different
paths through the control laws. Analysis showed this would have caused complete
failure of the DFCS and reversion to analog backup for several areas of the flight
envelope [23, pp. 41-42].
Several other difficulties and failure indications on the AFTI-F16 were traced to
the same source: asynchronous operation allowing different channels to take different
paths at certain selection points. The repair was to introduce voting at some of these
"software switches." In one particular case, repeated channel failure indications in
flight were traced to a roll-axis "software switch." It was decided to vote the switch
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(which, of course, required ad hoc synchronization) and extensive simulation and
testing were performed on the changes necessary to achieve this. On the next flight,
the problem was found still to be there. Analysis showed that although the switch
value was voted, it was the unvoted value that was used [23, p. 38].
The AFTI-F16 flight tests revealed numerous other problems of a similar nature.
Summarizing, Mackall [23, pp. 40-41] writes:
"The criticality and number of anomalies discovered in flight and
ground tests owing to design oversights are more significant than those
anomalies caused by actual hardware failures or software errors.
"... qualification of such a complex system as this, to some given level
of reliability, is difficult ...[because] the number of test conditions be-
comes so large that conventional testing methods would require a decade
for completion. The fault-tolerant design can also affect overall sys-
tem reliability by being made too complex and by adding characteristics
which are random in nature, creating an untestable design.
"As the operational requirements of avionics systems increase, com-
plexity increases. Reducing complexity appears to be more of an art
than a science and requires an experience base not yet available. If the
complexity is required, a method to make system designs more under-
standable, more visible, is needed.
"The asynchronous design of the [AFTI-F16] DFCS introduced a ran-
dom, unpredictable characteristic into the system. The system became
untestable in that testing for each of the possible time relationships be-
tween the computers was impossible. This random time relationship
was a major contributor to the flight test anoma_es. Adversely affecting
testability and having only postulated benefits, 5 asynchronous operation
of the DFCS demonstrated the need to avoid random, unpredictable, and
uncompensated design characteristics."
It is difficulties such as these that have caused those performing research in
fault-tolerant systems for DFCS to prefer synchronized channels and exact-match
voting [26-28]. Of course, the synchronization must itself be fault-tolerant and
no such algorithms were known until about 1982. 6 A number of provably correct
Byzantine fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithms are now available [32-37],
SThe decision to use an asynchronous design for the AFTI-F16 DFCS was because "the contrac-
tor [Bendix under subcontract to General Dynamics] believed synchronization would introduce a
single-point faSlure caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI) and lightning effects" [23, p. 7]--
which may well have been correct given the technology of the early 1980s.
aPrior to the investigations of the SIFT project [29], the subtlety and delicacy of voting and
synchronization protocols were not properly understood and most were seriously flawed: all were
vulnerable to Byzantine faults (which constitute a fault class that had not been recognized before),
and many were incapable of tolerating less severe faults. For example, the failure of the first attempt
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and some have been formally verified [38]. An algorithm due to Infis and Moore [39]
is attractively simple, and tolerates a very wide class of faults that is, however, short
of the fully Byzantine. Probabilistic algorithms due to Cristian [40] can achieve very
close synchronization, but also fall short of Byzantine fault tolerance.
For exact-match voting, each channel must operate on the same data. Thus the
computers cannot simply use their own private sensor readings, but must exchange
sampled values with each other in a Byzantine fault-tolerant manner. By this means,
every (working) computer begins each frame with the same set of sensor readings
as the others. 7 Each computer will then run the same sensor selection and averag-
ing algorithms, s and the same control laws, and should therefore generate identical
actuator commands. Exact-match majority voting of the actuator commands then
suffices to mask faults among the redundant channels. Notice that this arrange-
ment allows sensor failures to be distinguished from failures among the redundant
computers: sensor failure is detected or masked by the diagnostic, averaging, and
selection algorithms run by each computer, whereas failure of a computer is masked
(and optionally detected) by the exact-match majority voting of their outputs. In
contrast, systems based on unsynchronized, independent channels cannot distin-
guish accurately between the failure of a sensor and that of a computer, and may
mistake the consequences of clock drift for either.
Majority voting of actuator commands is sufficient to tolerate up to _ faults.
However, the underlying Byzantine fault-tolerant clock synchronization and inter-
active consistency algorithms can tolerate only N3----Afaults: thus a 4-plex is required
for single-fault tolerance, and a 7-plex for two-fault tolerance. Notice, however, that
the 7-plex can withstand two simultaneous faults; if the fault arrival rate is such
that a faulty channel can be identified and configured out of the system before the
next fault arrives, then a 7-plex can withstand 4 faults, and two-fault tolerance can
be achieved by a 5-plex. Fault detection and reconfiguration are complex functions,
however, and given our desire to reason formally about fault-tolerance properties,
we follow [9] and consider only the nonreconfigurable case in this work. (Reconfig-
uration was considered in the verification of SIFT [53].)
Not all faults are equal: some are "hard" faults that permanently disable the
afflicted channel; others are "soft" or "transient" faults from which recovery is pos-
to launch the Space Shuttle was due to a synchronization problem [30], and the heavy radiation
environment at Jupiter caused loss of synchronization on the Voyager spacecraft [31].
7A given sensor may be sampled independently by several computers; all of these independent
samples must be distributed to all other computers in a Byzantine fault-tolerant manner. As
with clock synchronization, several Byzantine agreement (or interactive consistency) algorithms are
known [41], and some have been formally verified down to the hardware implementation level [42,43].
Sin addition to detecting faults, the processing of sensor data must deal with noise, bias, drift,
hysteresis, and other sensor-specific issues. The problems of sensor averaging, selection, and (espe-
cially) fault diagnosis have been considered, more or less independently, by several disciplines--for
example, control theory [44-49], artificial intelligence [50,51], and computer science [52].
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sible. Examples of transient faults include SEUs (where a single bit of memory is
flipped by a cosmic ray), which can be recovered by simply restoring the affected bit
to its correct value. Experience indicates that transient faults are orders of magni-
tude more common than hard faults--for example, Voyager spacecraft suffered 42
SEUs in the intense radiation surrounding Jupiter, but no hard faults [54]. It follows
that overall reliability will be much greater---or, equivalently, much less redundancy
will be required for a given level of reliability--if some attempt is made to recover
channels that suffer transient faults.
There is no firm line between transient and hard faults considered in the abstract;
what might be merely a transient fault to one system may be a hard fault to another
that lacks the necessary recovery mechanisms. Fault-tolerant system architectures
are designed and evaluated against explicitly stated fault models. For transient
faults, we employ a fault model in which we distinguish two subclasses of faults.
State data faults are those in which the processor is working correctly (i.e., is
synchronized and executing the right task), but its local state data are cor-
rupted. If its state data were replaced with correct values, it would recover.
In our formal model, the predicate OK(i)(c) will indicate whether processor i
has state data faults that can affect its computation of task c.
Control faults are those in which the processor is not working correctly (i.e., some-
thing other than, or additional to, a state data fault has occurred). In our
formal model, the predicate .T'(i)(j) will indicate whether processor i suffers a
control fault during the computation of the j'th task.
In our model, we think of control faults as happening spontaneously, and state data
faults as the consequences of control faults. Faults such as SEUs, in which a single
bit of state data is spontaneously corrupted, can be considered as instantaneous
control faults: we imagine that the processor computes the wrong value but then
immediately recovers, leaving a state data fault behind. Note that a state data
fault may precipitate a further control fault. For example, a word of memory may
become set to zero (a state data fault); then a subsequent divide operation using
that word might generate a divide-by-zero trap, which could halt the processor (a
control fault).
State data faults can be recovered by periodically replacing the state data main-
tained by each processor with a majority-voted version. It is not necessary to vote
and replace all the state data, since many of them are refreshed by sampling sensors
(i.e., some of the state data are "stored" in the airframe itself [18]): only the data
that are carried forward from one frame or cycle to the next (e.g., time-integrated
data such as velocity and position) need to be voted. Even so, the quantity of state
data maintained by a modern DFCS is considerable, and performance would be se-
riously degraded if all of it were voted at every opportunity. Accordingly, exposure
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is traded for performance and rather sparse voting patterns are preferred. Clearly
the less frequently a particular item of state data is voted, the longer will be the
duration of the consequences of a fault that corrupts that item. Overall reliability
will be determined by the fault arrival rate, the voting pattern, and the dataflow
dependencies among control tasks and state data items.
In this report, our goal is to develop, and formally specify, a model that describes
the operation of an N-plex with transient-recovery based on an arbitrary sparse
voting pattern. We will formally verify a theorem concerning the conditions under
which such a system masks faults successfully. A concrete instance of the theorem
(for a specific data dependency graph and voting pattern) might be that the system
is "safe" provided that at most two processors suffer control faults in any sequence
of five successive frames. Maxkov or other methods of reliability analysis must be
used to determine the overall reliability of the system, given assumptions about the
arrival and repair rates of control faults [9].
A fault-tolerant system should take active measures to recover from transient
control faults, in addition to the voting strategy for overcoming state data faults.
The Mars system [55,27] is a good example of a system that provides sucl/recovery.
In our model, however, we do not consider the internal details of mechanisms that
achieve recovery from control faults, we model only their external behavior; the
purpose of our model is to derive properties of the majority voting strategy for
masking faults of all kinds and recovering from state data transient faults.
1.3 Formal Models for DFCS
In this section we sketch the larger context of the work described here, and then give
an overview of the model for fault-masking and transient-recovery that we employ.
This work was performed in the context of a research program led by NASA Lan-
gley Research Center that aims to develop a fault-tolerant architecture for DFCS
using formal methods to provide a rigorous basis for documenting and analyzing de-
sign decisions. Ultimately, we hope to provide mechanically-checked formal specifi-
cations and verifications for the key components of a "Reliable Computing Platform"
for DFCS, going all the way from high-level requirements down to implementation
details. Clearly, this is a major undertaking, so initially we are concentrating on
some of the better-understood requirements and levels in the hierarchy.
As we described in the previous section, synchronized channels and Byzantine
fault-tolerant distribution of sensor values are now fairly well-understood require-
ments. Accordingly, the first mechanically-checked specifications and verifications
undertaken in this program were those performed for Byzantine fault-tolerant clock
synchronization algorithms [38, 56] and for a Byzantine agreement algorithm [42]
and circuit [43]. The work described here is a step towards the next higher layer
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in the modeling hierarchy: the layer that uses exact-match voting to provide fault-
tolerance and transient-recovery.
Accurate modeling of that layer must account for the fact that the separate
channels are not perfectly synchronized (the clock-synchronization algorithms keep
the separate channels synchronized only within some small skew _ of each other),
and that the communication and coordination of voting data takes a certain amount
of time. The work presented here ignores those details in order to concentrate on
the relationship between voting patterns, fault masking, and transient recovery.
Thus, we make the simplifying assumptions that the separate channels are perfectly
synchronized, and that the communication and voting of data constitute a single
atomic action. 9
Our current work, following on from that described here, aims to eliminate these
simplifying assumptions. In other current work, we are developing and formally
verifying a hardware-assisted implementation of one of the clock-synchronization
algorithms. Future work may consider the mechanisms by which failed channels
can be recovered, or the system reconfigured. The next section gives an informal
overview of the model that is the focus of the present analysis.
1.3.1 Overview of the Fault-Masking Model Employed
In companion work at NASA Langley Research Center, Di Vito, Butler and Cald-
well [9] have developed a formal model for DFCS and derived its fault-masking and
transient-recovery properties. Their model and development is formal and rigorous
in the manner of conventional mathematical discourse. The purpose of our investiga-
tion is to construct a completely formal, machine-checked specification for a similar
model, and to submit the derived properties to mechanical proof-checking. The two
investigations are complementary: the first is intended to model the structure of a
realistic platform for DFCS, while the second is intended to explore the problems
of subjecting formal specifications and verifications in this domain to mechanically
checked analysis.
Our model for fault masking and transient-recovery was developed in parallel
with that of [9] and differs from it in several details, though not in overall principle.
In this section, we briefly sketch the model of Di Vito, Butler, and Caldwell, and
explain how and why ours differs. The relationship is described in more detail in
Chapter 4.
Di Vito, Butler, and CaldweU model a reliable computing platform for DFCS
with the following characteristics:
* The system workload is a multi-rate periodic schedule.
9Verification of the Oral Messages Byzantine agreement algorithm [42,43] makes the same sim-
phfying assumptions.
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The schedule is static (i.e., the sequence of frames is identical from one cycle
to another, and the subsequence of tasks within a given frame is the same in
every activation of that frame).
All frames have equal duration; however, different frames may have different
numbers of tasks, and different tasks may have different duration. Unused
time at the end of a frame is called "slack" time; it can be used to run self-
tests. Some slack time at both the beginning and the end of each frame is
essential when discrete-update clock synchronization is used, since otherwise
tasks could be skipped (if the clock jumps forward) or repeated (if it jumps
back) [34].
The output of a task may be used as input to a later task up to one cycle
later. Data that need to be carried further forward must be relayed through
intermediate tasks.
Sensors are sampled and actuators commanded at most once per frame. An
underlying Byzantine fault-tolerant distribution of sensor samples is assumed,
so that each (working) channel receives identical sensor input.
The fault model distinguishes processors that are working correctly throughout
a frame from those that are not. In our terminology, correctly working proces-
sors, or more briefly, working processors, are those without control faults. A
fault-status predicate indicates whether a given processor is working or not in
the current frame. Faults can be either permanent (i.e., hard) or transient--
the latter is modeled by a processor whose fault-status is not working in one
frame and working in a later one. The model does not consider the mechanisms
by which such recovery might be achieved, l°
Various voting patterns are considered. In continuous voting, all state data
are voted every frame; in cyclic voting, only the outputs of tasks in the current
frame are voted in that frame; minimal voting uses the dataflow dependencies
among tasks to derive conditions that vote the minimum data each frame.
A distinguished state data item, the frame-counter is always voted at every
frame.
All processors run identical workloads. The benchmark with respect to which
fault-masking and transient-recovery results are proved is a single processor
running the same workload that suffers no faults.
1°Among the likely mechanisms are watchdog timers that trap to automatic re-initialization code,
and similar reinitialization of the losers in a majority vote. In addition, the schedule table and the
object code for the system executive and application tasks may be held in ROM, where all faults
may be assumed hard, but also extremely rare.
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Our model is very similar in spirit and motivation to that just described; it differs
in being considerably more abstract. The reason for this is that we want our results
to be as widely applicable as possible. Mechanically checked formal specification and
verification are very time consuming to perform and mechanically checked proofs
tend to be rather fragile. By this we mean that redoing a mechanically checked
proof to accommodate changes to the statement of a theorem, or modifications to
supporting lemmas, may require a quantity of effort and insight comparable to that
required to construct the proof in the first place. Thus it is often not cost-effective to
prove properties about a variant model by adjusting proofs from the original model.
A generally more productive approach is to employ abstraction and hierarchy: one
attempts to extract the essence of the problem and to prove the most general results
possible for an abstract formulation of the problem. More concrete models can then
be constructed as instantiations or elaborations of the abstract model, and properties
concerning the elaborations can be proved using the abstract theorem as a lemma.
In the present case, we obviously wish to derive results that are sufficiently gen-
eral that they can apply to all three of the voting schedules considered by Di Vito,
Butler, and Caldwell. We would also like them to be applicable to systems that
make rather different basic assumptions--for example, systems in which sensors are
sampled and actuators commanded more then once per frame, or in which not all
cycles have identical frame schedules (so that dynamic scheduling can be accommo-
dated). We wish to state and prove general results along the lines of "provided the
voting strategy satisfies certain properties, and providing certain fault assumptions
are met, then an N-plex correctly masks faults and recovers from transients."
A little thought reveals that the essence of this problem concerns the interaction
between voting strategies, task schedules, and data dependencies. To see this, con-
sider a particular actuator command. We want the majority value for this command
to equal the "correct" value (i.e., that which would be produced by a single fault-free
processor). Clearly, this will be so if a majority of processors are working correctly
at the time they execute the task concerned and if they receive the correct input
values. Input values either come from sensors (and our requirement here is that
all working processors receive the same values), or they are the outputs of previous
tasks, _vhich may or may not have been voted. In the case of voted outputs, we
recurse on the conditions that establish the correctness of voted outputs; in the case
of nonvoted outputs, the requirement is that the majority were working correctly
when that task was executed, and that their inputs were, in turn, correct at that
point. Obviously a development along these lines must make very careful statements
about its assumptions, and there are many tricky details to be taken care of, but
it is equally obvious that the notions of cycles and frames are not essential to the
argument: it is the order in which tasks are executed, the dataflow dependencies
among them, and the placement of majority votes that determine the correctness of
the overall scheme.
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Thus, frames and cycles are not explicitly represented in our model: we represent
the system workload by the dataflow dependency graph among task activations, 11
and a record of the order in which tasks are activated. We allow voting to be
specified for the outputs of any task activation, and we model processor failure at
the task activation level (i.e., a given processor is either working or not working
during a given task activation). It should be clear that a periodic, frame-based
interpretation can be achieved by simply imposing additional structure on the task
activation dataflow dependency graph and on the task execution schedule. (For
example, by requiring them to have a periodic structure, allowing only one voted
task per frame, treating failure during any task activation as a failure for the whole
frame, and so on.) In this way, results proven for our abstract model provide a basis
for deriving results for more concrete models relatively easily.
In addition to cycles and frames, we have abstracted away another aspect of
the model of Di Vito, Butler, and Caldwell: the frame-counter. Some may consider
our use of abstraction to have been overly aggressive in this regard. Our original
motivation was as follows. For a given processor to compute the correct outputs
for a certain task activation, it must be working correctly during that task, and
it must get the correct inputs. Whether it gets the correct inputs is a function of
when data were voted, and of how long the processor has been working correctly.
Here, "working correctly" means correctly executing the right programs at the right
time, but on possibly corrupted data--i.e., it is the absence of control faults. We
do not model the mechanisms by which a processor that has been not working (i.e.,
has suffered a transient control fault) gets back into the working state (i.e., recovers
from the control fault). Part of this process may involve purging internal corruption
(e.g., a stuck-at carry-flag) by means of a system reset, or a power cycle. Another
part may involve reloading external state data (such as the identity of the current
point in the task schedule--i.e., the frame counter). Surely, reloading this datum is
simply part of the internal process of recovery from a control fault, and is therefore
part of an activity that we have explicitly chosen not to model.
A counter-argument to this position would observe that the only reliable source
for such external data is the majority-voted consensus of the other processors. Thus,
this part of the process for recovery from control faults depends on the voting
strategy and on the mechanism for recovery from state data faults--the very core
of what we have chosen to model. We are partly persuaded by this argument, but
note that the data concerned differ from other state data treated within the model
in that they are not produced and consumed by application tasks but by the system
11A task properly refers to a particular program, viewed as a static entity (e.g., as a sequence
of bytes, or as a function from inputs to outputs), a task activation refers to an instance of that
program in execution. There is only one instance of each task, but it gives rise to many activations.
Sometimes, when the context makes the intended interpretation clear, we use the shorter term task
to mean task activation.
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executive itself. On the other hand, we are not attracted to a special-case treatment
of the frame counter--if other system state data needed to be recovered in a similar
way, another special-case adjustment to the model might be needed.
Our current preference thus remains the exclusion of the frame counter from our
basic system model. However, the frame counter (and other state data used by the
executive rather than by the application tasks) can be introduced quite simply and
naturally when the model is instantiated: simply introduce a voted task (interpreted
as the vote of the frame counter and other system state data) at the beginning of each
frame 12 and introduce a data dependency of all other tasks within the frame on the
output of that particular task. This last is an artifact of the model (in that no real
dataflow need occur), but serves to establish the (control) dependency of subsequent
tasks upon the correctness of the value for the frame counter obtained by (the task
corresponding to) the vote on its value. The task that votes the frame counter is
understood to be a standard task performed by all (synchronized) processors at
frame-start time, independently of whether they (already) know what frame it is
they should be executing.
Although the modeling is indirect, this approach allows the properties of sys-
tems with a voted frame counter to be derived correctly, while preserving the
abstractness--and hence the wider applicability--of our model. Unlike special-case
treatment for the frame counter, our approach easily accommodates more or less
frequent voting of this value, and the introduction of additional state data that are
required for the correct execution of the executive itself.
In Chapter 2, we present the details of our fault-masking model in the form of
a traditional mathematical development.
12In [9], all voting occurs at the end of each frame; thus, in this case, the identity of the current
frame is recovered by the vote at the end of the previous frame. Clearly, our approach can be
adjusted to accommodate this alternative arrangement.
Chapter 2
The Fault-Masking Model
Our goal is to prove that, subject to certain conditions, an N-plex provides transient-
recovery and fault masking for a certain class of faults. Our first requirement, there-
fore, is a benchmark model for correct, fault-free behavior, against which the efficacy
of transient-recovery and fault masking in the N-plex may be judged. We take as
our benchmark a model for the behavior of a fault-free process-control system. Our
model for an N-plex will then compose N fault-prone versions of the basic model,
together with some voting and recovery mechanisms, and our theorem will estab-
lish that the voted results of the N-plex equal those of the fault-free system (under
suitable conditions). We begin by describing our model for fault-free process control.
2.1 A Model for Fault-Free Process Control
A process-control system manages some physical device by sending control signals
to actuators. The values of the control signals are determined by calculations based
on the values of sensors that monitor the device and on a record (maintained by
the process-control system) of the state of the system. The process-control system
is internally composed of computational tasks that are activated periodically in
order to sample sensors, perform the necessary calculations, and send values to the
actuators. Some tasks may also perform internal housekeeping functions. Because
task activations may depend on the results of other task activations, there is a
dataflow dependency among task activations that the execution schedule must take
into account. The "slots" in the execution schedule are called cells1; a process-
control system requires a specification of which tasks are assigned to which cells, the
dataflow relationships among cells, and the order in which cells are to be executed.
These ideas are formalized in the following definitions.
1In a frame-based system they are often called subJrames.
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We assume
* A set C of cells, and
• A relation G _CC × (l_l x C) (where lq denotes the natural numbers),
and we define
def
• M = {1,2,...,ICI}.
Ceils correspond to the activations (or executions) of tasks (to be formally de-
fined later) or the sampling of sensors; the relation G records the data[tow dependen-
cies among task activations associated with cells: the interpretation of (i, (n, j)) E G
is that the output of the task activation (or sensor sample) associated with cell i
supplies the input for the n'th argument of the task activation associated with cell
j. A simplified relation
• -_ de.=f{(i,j)]3n : (i, (n,j)) E G)
captures just the basic dataflow dependencies among cells, without concern for which
input of cell j it is that receives its data from i. We will ensure by conditions given
later that G is a directed acyclic graph--so that there are no circularities in the
dependencies among cells.
Note that the set C of cells comprises all the task activations performed during
a single run of the system (which may extend for the entire lifetime of the system).
It is therefore potentially unbounded (though finite) in size. For many (statically
scheduled) process-control systems, the set C and its associated data dependency
graph G will have a repetitive structure induced by the "unrolling" of a periodic, or
cyclic, pattern of activity.
Cells with indegree zero in G axe called sensor cells; those with outdegree zero
are called actuator cells. The set of sensor cells is denoted Cs; that of actuators is
denoted CA. Nonsensor cells (including actuator cells) have a computational task
associated with them and are called active-task cells. The set C \ Cs of active-task
cells is denoted CT.
Each task activation (or sensor sample) generates a value that is either com-
municated to an actuator or stored so that it will be avail£ble as input to later
task activations. The system state records these Stored output values. Formally, we
define
• A set D of domain values, and
• A set of states S C_C _ D.
The data values computed, stored, and manipulated by the system are assumed
to be drawn from the uninterpreted domain D. The system state is represented by a
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function from cells to this domain: if a E 8 is the instantaneous state of the system,
and e is a cell, then a(c) denotes the output value stored for that ceil. It may seem
that a system satisfying this description must have a huge amount of storage in order
to record the values of all task activations for all time. This is not so. Anticipating
definitions that are given below, we observe that tasks are executed in a sequential
order that respects the dependency ordering represented in the graph G, and run
to completion. There is no need to record a value for a cell that has not yet been
executed, nor for one whose immediate successors in the relation G have already
completed. Although this result is intuitively obvious, its formal verification is an
interesting exercise (see page 47).
Formalizing the notion of sequential execution, we introduce
• A bijection sched: M ---, C, with
• Inverse when: C ---, M.
The interpretation here is that the i'th task execution (or sensor sample) is the
one associated with cell sched(i); conversely, the activity at cell c is the when(c)'th
to be executed. We require that the order of execution respect the dataflow depen-
dencies recorded in G:
(i,j) E G D when(i) < when(j).
Notice that this requires that G is acyclic.
Active-task cells have some computational task associated with them, so we
require
• A set T C_8 -_ D of task-functions, and
• A function task: CT "-'* T.
When an active-task cell c executes, the function task(c) is applied to the current
state, say a, yielding the result task( c )( a ). This is then stored in the system state
as the value of cell c to yield a new state r. That is,
r = a with [c := task(c)(a)]
where with [...] denotes function modification (as in EItDM).: The only compo-
nents of the system state that may influence the result are those of the immediate
:The notation f with [z := a], where x is a value in the domain of f and a a value in the range,
denotes a function with the same signature as f defined by
f with [x := a](y) = if z = y then a else f(x).
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predecessors of cell c in the dataflow dependency graph _.3 Formally, we state this
as a requirement that the result be functionally dependent on just those values:
(v(a, e) e a(a) = T(a)) > task(c)(a) = task(c)(T).
Sensor cells store their results in the system state just like active-task cells.
However, they take no input from the system state; instead, they sample properties
of the external environment (including control inputs). These properties vary with
time, so it might seem that sensors should be modeled as functions of real-time. In
fact, this is unnecessary and inappropriate, since our model is not concerned with
real-time properties such as absolute execution rates, but with those of sequencing
and voting. We want to prove that if an N-plex gets the same sensor samples as
an ideal fault-free system, then it will deliver the same actuator commands (despite
the occurrence of faults). Thus, we need only model the sensor samples actually
obtained, which can be done by modeling sensor samples as functions of position in
the execution schedule (i.e., we use the number of cells executed as our notion of
"time"). Thus we introduce
• A set S C M _ D of sensor-functions, and
• A function sensor: Cs --* S.
When a sensor cell c executes, the sensor-function s = sensor(c) samples the
environment (at time when(c)) to yield the value s(when(c)). This is then stored
in the system-state as the value of cell c.
Formally, the execution of cells is modeled by the function
• step: S × C ---*S
where
step(a, c) def= a with [c := if c E Cs then sensor(c)(when(c)) else task(c)(a)]
is the new state that results from executing the task of cell c in state a at time
when(c).
We are interested in the state after the system has executed some number m of
cells according to its schedule. This is modeled by the function
• run:M--*S
3Operationally, the function task(c) is applied to the tuple of values
(_(c,),_(c2) .... ,_(c.))
where (c,, (i, c)) • G and n = indegree(c).
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where
run(O) c S,
run(m + 1)
A variant is the function
• runto: C -* S
where
de=f step(run(m),sched(m + 1)).
ru.to(c) de2ru.(when(e))
is the state of the system when execution of its schedule has reached cell c. Observe
that run(0), the initial state, is chosen arbitrarily.
2.2 The N-plex Model
In this section, we admit the possibility that machines may fail and we introduce
replication and voting to overcome that fallibility.
We assume a replicated system comprising r _> 3 component systems of the type
described in the previous section and we define
def
• R = {1,2,...,r).
In the following, we will often refer to the component systems as "machines."
Component machines may fail and revive independently; at any time a machine
is either "failed" or "working." This is specified by a function
• .T: R _ (M ---*{T, F})
where .T(i)(m)is T just in case component machine i is failed at time m. 4 Intuitively,
a component machine i is failed at time m if it suffers a control fault at any point
during execution of the task scheduled at time m. We know nothing at all about the
behavior of failed component machines. Working (i.e., non-failed) machines correctly
compute the function associated with the task scheduled at time m. However, the
result computed may be incorrect if an earlier failure has caused the input data to
be bad. A machine that is working correctly, but on bad data, has state data faults
that will eventually be overcome through majority voting of state data.
States of the replicated machine are drawn from the set
4A function with range {T, F} can be interpreted as the characteristic predicate of a set (this
is how sets are defined in ErtDM). Thus .T'(i) can be interpreted as the set of times when the i'th
machine is failed during execution of the cell scheduled at that time.
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Thus, if p E 7_ is a replicated state, then p(i) is the state of the i'th component
machine, and p(i)(c) is the value of cell c in that machine.
The components of a replicated machine behave much like a single machine,
except that components may fail, and so they periodically vote their results. Thus
we assume a set
• Cv of voted ceUs
and require
CA C_ Cv C_ CT
(that is, all actuator cells are voted, but no sensor cells are). s
Each execution step in the replicated machine takes place in two stages. In the
first stage, each working component machine performs a single (ordinary) step. This
is specified by the function
• sstep:TixC_T¢
where
-_._(i)(when(c)) D sstep(p, c)(i) = step(p(i), c).
This definition states that a working component machine updates its own state in
exactly the same way the unreplicated system model would, given the same state.
Two important consequences of this definition may not be obvious:
• If cell c is a sensor cell, then the value of step(p(i), c) is
p(i) with [c := sensor(c)(when(c))]
(this comes from the definition of step). Note that the expression in the
with clause is independent of the machine i; thus, as noted above, our model
requires that all working machines get exactly the same sensor samples.
If machine i is failed when execution of cell c should be performed, we
know nothing whatsoever about the subsequent state of that machine, i.e.,
sstep(p, c)(i). We do not assume merely that the value stored for cell c could
be incorrect; we allow the whole state (of that machine) to be damaged or
destroyed.
When a voted cell is executed, the working component machines each calculate
the majority vote of the full set of all their individual results. This is specified by
the function
_Sensor cells are not voted because we assume an underlying Byzantine fanlt-tolerant distribution
mechanism which ensures that all working machines get the same sensor samples. This assumption
is captured in the definition of the function sstep.
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• vote: 7"dx C --*
where
-_Jr(i)(when(c)) D vote(p, c)(i) = p(i) with [c := maj_{p(j)(e)lj E R}],
maj is the "majority" function, and _{p(j)(c)l j E R} denotes the bag (multiset) of
values recorded for cell c by all the component machines. 6
As with the sstep function, we know absolutely nothing about the state of a failed
component machine after a vote in which it should have participated. Another inter-
esting element of this definition is that all working machines are specified to perform
a majority vote on the same bag of values: this suggests they must not only read
each other's values correctly, but they should agree on the values attributed to faulty
components. These are precisely the requirements that "Byzantine agreement" (also
known as "interactive consistency") algorithms are required to satisfy. It may seem,
therefore, that any realization of this model should employ a Byzantine agreement
algorithm to distribute the values to be voted among all of the component machines.
This is unnecessary, however, since it is a majority vote that is being computed, and
our results will establish that the good values comprise a majority. Thus, the values
ascribed to failed processors are irrelevant, and the working processors do not, in
fact, need to agree on those values. We do not prove this result here; we regard it
as a proof obligation on the implementation.
The overall behavior of the replicated machine is specified by the function
• rstep:Tl x C --* Tt
which is simply the appropriate combination of the two steps above:
. , def f vote(sstep(p, c), c) if c E Cv
rstep[p,c) = _ sstep(p,e) otherwise.
Functions rrun and rrunto are defined analogously to the single machine case: 7
• rrun:M_T¢,
_Note that maj is a partial function: it is undefined if an absolute majority of components do
not agree on a value. Our results will always take care to establish conditions in which it is defined.
A fast and very clever algorithm for calculating the majority function was discovered by Boyer and
Moore during the SIFT project [57].
tReaders unfamiliar with higher-order logic may find the, so-called "Curried," functions that
we employ somewhat strange. Rather than the Curried application rrun(m)(i)(c), they might
prefer the application of a function with multiple arguments: rrun(m, i, c). The advantage of our
approach is that the separate components of the application have individual mezadng and can be
manipulated individually: rrun(rn) is the state of the replicated machine after m steps, rrun(rn)(i)
is the state of the i'th component machine at that point, and rrnn{m)(i)(c) is the value stored for
cell c in that state.
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is given by
rrun(O)
rrun(m + 1)
ae =
def_ rstep(rrun(m), sched(m + 1))
and
* rrunto: C --_ Tt
by
rrunto(c) ae_.=frrun(when(c) ).
Notice that our model assumes that computation and voting are atomic, and that
the components of the replicated machine are completely synchronous. These are
idealizations of reality and we intend to explore more realistic assumptions in later
work. They are adequate, however, for the purpose of the current investigation,
where we are primarily concerned to develop the conditions under which majority
voting successfully masks transient failures.
2.3 Fault Tolerance and Transient-Recovery
Our goal in this section is to show that, under certain conditions concerning the
failure "pattern" 5r, the replicated machine produces the same actuator behavior as
the single machine, despite failures among the components of the replicated machine.
Our requirements are that the majority-voted value for each actuator should be the
correct value--that is, the value produced by a single fault-free system. In our
model, actuator cells are voted, so that any nonfaulty component machine will set
its own value for an actuator cell to that of the majority. Thus, the correctness
statement can be rephrased as the requirement that the value computed for an
actuator cell by any nonfaulty component machine should be the correct value.
We can state the condition that a component machine i have the correct value
for cell c in terms of a predicate:
• good-value: R x C _ {T, F}
where
good-value( i, c) ¢le_=_frrunto( c)( i )( c ) = runto( c )( c ).
We then seek a predicate
• safe: C _ {T, F}
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such that
Vc cA,i e R: ( afe(c)A 9ood-value(i,c).
Intuitively, safe(c) will capture the conditions under which the replicated machine
has enough working components, and those components have been working for long
enough since their last failure, that good values form a majority and faults will be
masked successfully.
If only actuator cells were voted, it would be trivial to derive the required result:
safe(c) would be the condition that a majority of components have been working
continuously since the very first cell through the computation and vote of cell c. That
this condition is sufficient follows from the fact that working component machines
given the same inputs produce the same results as each other; failed machines can
produce anything (including nothing). Thus, the continuously working machines
will agree among themselves at every voting stage and, since they are hypothesized
to be in the majority, leave their states unchanged. Since actuator cells are voted,
any machine that is working during the vote of an actuator cell will acquire the
correct value from this continuously-correct majority.
To see that this condition is necessary, suppose that there has not been a ma-
jority of components working continuously since the beginning. Then a majority of
machines have failed at some time or other prior to the execution of cell c. When
they failed, they may have destroyed their system state. Since we are now assuming
no votes other than at actuators (and actuators do not provide input to other cells),
this corruption may persist even after a failed machine starts working again. Thus a
failed machine cannot be guaranteed ever to recover fully. Since these machines are
hypothesized to form a majority by the time cell c is executed, they could outvote
the good machines at that point.
Without intermediate voting of state values, a component machine that suffers a
transient failure may never fully recover, since there is no way for it to repair its state
data. Intermediate voting can allow this repair to take place, so that the conditions
in the predicate safe become less Draconian. There are many possible strategies for
intermediate voting: we can vote at every cell or only at certain cells, and we can
vote the entire state, or just some portions of it, or just the value computed at that
cell. Voting more data or voting more often than required can be very expensive,
using up resources that could be put to better use. Early DFCS maintained very
little state data and it was feasible to vote the entire state every frame. Modern
systems maintain much more information and it is necessary to be more sparing
in the frequency of voting, and in the quantity of data voted. Obviously there
is a trade-off here: voting less frequently, or less data at each vote, may increase
the time taken to recover from transients, and thereby reduce the reliability of the
system. Clearly, overall reliability depends upon the relationship between the voting
strategy, the fault arrival rate, and the dataflow dependencies in the system. We
26 Chapter 2. The F_ult-Ma_king Model
need to encode this relationship as the condition in the predicate safe. Intuitively,
the condition must ensure that, for every cell, a majority of machines have been
working for long enough since their last failure that they have acquired correct
values (from sensor samples or votes) for data values that ultimately contribute to
the value of cell c, and have computed all intermediate values correctly. Stating this
condition formally requires some additional definitions.
We define
• foundation: C ---*7_(C), where 7_ denotes powerset,
recursively as follows:
{c)foundation(c) dej {c} U U foundation(b)
(b,c)eG
if c E (Cs U Cv)
otherwise
and
• support:C _ 79(C)
by
a,r [ {c}u U /oundation(b) if c e Cv
support(c)
= I (b,c)eUfoundation(c) otherwise.
The foundation of a cell c consists of all those cells that directly or indirectly con-
tribute input data to c by a path that does not pass through any (other) voted cells.
Note that a voted or sensor cell is its own foundation.
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of these concepts. In the figure, circles
indicate cells, double circles indicate voted cells and the arrows indicate dataflow
dependencies (the arrow from cell D to cell A represents the arc (A, D) E G; the
direction of the arrowhead indicates the dependency relation, rather than the flow
of data). The left to right position of cells on the page suggests the order in which
they are executed. In this case, the foundation for cell J is just {J} (since J is
a voted cell), that for A is {A} (since A is a sensor cell), and that for cell D is
{A,C,D}.
The support for a nonvoted cell is simply the foundation for that cell; the support
for a voted cell is the union of the foundations of all the cells that directly provide
input to that cell. The intuition here is that if a machine computes correct values
for all the cells in support(c), and if the machine keeps working, then the value
eventually computed for cell c will be correct. In Figure 2.1, the supports for A and
D equal their foundations, whereas the support for the voted cell J is {A, C, D, J}.
A machine that is working throughout the support of cell J will compute the correct
value for that cell: since it is working at sensor cell A, it will acquire the correct
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Figure 2.1: Example Dataflow Dependency Graph
sample value from that sensor; since it is working at voted cell C, it will acquire the
correct value for that cell during its majority vote, even if it had been failed earlier
and had not computed the right value itself s; since it has the correct input values
for cell D and is working at that cell, it will compute the correct output value; and
since it has (from D) the correct input value for cell J, and is working at J, it will
compute the correct value for J.
We need just a few more definitions. The function
• committed-to: C _ M
is defined by
committed-to(c) d¢=frain {when(a)la e support(c) }.
In the example of Figure 2.1, committed-to(J) = when(A). Once a machine reaches
committed-to(c) in its schedule, it must keep working until when(c) if it is to compute
the correct value for cell c. Conversely, if it does keep working throughout this
period, it will compute the correct value for cell c even if its own state data are
corrupt at the beginning of the period. This is because all the data required to
compute cell c are derived either from sensor samples, or from voted values, that are
acquired at or later than committed-to(c). Thus, provided enough other machines
aWe are assuming here that enough machines were working correctly at c that correct values
form the majority. We cannot give a characterization of the necessary condition yet, since we are
in the process of developing the concepts that make its statement possible.
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are working, this machine wilt acquire good values during the votes and sensor-
samples and its own bad state data will not contribute to the result.
The function OK captures the condition under which a particular component
machine has been working for "long enough" since its last fault that any bad state
data values have been replaced by good values through votes and sensor samples--so
that it is able to compute a good result for the current cell. Thus,
• OK:R --. (C -* {T,F})
is defined by
OK(i)(c) def (Vm: committed-to(c) < m <_ when(c) D _.T(i)(m)).
In other words, OK(i)(c) is the condition which ensures that component machine i
has no state data faults that can affect the value computed for cell c.
For the replicated machine to be safe, a majority of its components must be OK
for every cell. We therefore introduce the function
• MOK: C -_ {T, F}
(for Majority OK) defined as follows
MOK(c) def 30 C_R, IOI > r/2 : i E 0 D OK(i)(c).
We then define the predicate safe as follows
safe(c) dej (Va: when(a) <_ when(c) D MOK(a)).
That is, the replicated machine is safe at cell c if, the condition MOK holds at c
itself and at all cells evaluated earlier than e.
Now we can state and prove our main theorem. This "Consensus Theorem" is
similar to lemmas of that name in [9].
Theorem 1 (Consensus Theorem) If safe(c), then
Yj e R: OK(j)(c) D good-value(j, c).
Proof: The proof is by strong induction on when(c). The basis is the case
when(c) = 1, in which case c must be a sensor cell, and so
rrunto(c)(j)(c) = sensor(c)(1) = runto(c)(c)
as required.
For the inductive step, suppose the theorem true for all cells a such that
when(a) < when(c) and let j be a component machine such that OK(j)(c). If
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c E Cs, the argument is the same as for the basis case, and so we consider c E CT
and consider a such that (a, e) E G. Since the result of e is a function of its inputs,
the result will follow if we can demonstrate
good-value(j, a ).
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: a E Cv. It may not be that OK(j)(a) and so we cannot appeal to the
inductive hypothesis directly, but we do know that MOK(a) and hence that
a majority of machines exemplified by k (possibly not including j) satisfy
Og(k)(a). By the inductive hypothesis, good-value(k,a) for these machines.
Now, we hypothesized og(j)(c) and hence _(j)(a). It follows that during
the voting stage of the execution of cell a, machine j will acquire the majority
value for that cell, i.e., good-value(j, a), as required.
Case 2: a _. Cv. A component machine i is OK for cell c if it is working throughout
the period from committed-to(c) to when(c). Observe that the support of a
nonvoted cell a is a subset of any cell c to which it provides input. It follows
that committed-to(a) can be no earlier than committed-to(c). We must also
have when(a) < when(c). Thus og(i)(c) D OK(i)(a) and the result then
follows directly from the inductive hypothesis.
[]
The result we seek follows from the Consensus Theorem:
Corollary 1 For c E CA, if safe(e) then
Vi E R: -_Y(i)(when(c)) D good-value(i, c).
Proof: The statement of the corollary implies MOK(c), so there must exist j E R
such that og(j)(c). The Consensus Theorem then supplies
Vj E R : OK(j)(c) D good-value(j, c)
which, on expanding the definition of good-value, gives
rrunto(c)(j)(c) = runto(c)(c).
Now c E CA, so c is a voted cell, and the definition of the voting function ensures,
Vi,j E R: (_Y(i)(when(c))A-_Y(j)(when(c))) D rrunto(c)(i)(c) = rrunto(c)(j)(c),
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since all working machines acquire the majority value as the result of voted cells. By
definition, OK(j)(e) D -_:F(j)(when(c)). Hence, for any i E R such that -,U(i)(c),
rrunto(c)(i)(c) = rrunto(c)(j)(c)= runto(c)(c)
and we conclude good-value(i, c) as required. []
In words, the corollary states that each working component of the replicated
machine computes the correct value for an actuator if a majority of machines is
working throughout the period from committed-to(c) to when(c) for each cell c in
the schedule up to and including the actuator concerned.
In Chapter 3, we consider the formal specification of this model in EttDM, and
the mechanically-checked verification of the results derived above.
Chapter 3
Specification and Verification
in EHDM
In this chapter we give an overview of the formal specification and verification in
Eli DM of the model presented in Chapter 2. It is not our purpose to provide a general
introduction to EHDM here; readers unfamiliar with the EHDM language and system
are referred to yon ttenke and Rushby [7]. Our purpose is rather to discuss some of
the more interesting issues raised by the formalization, and to provide a road map
to the complete listings of the EHDM specification and verification, which are given
in the Appendices. The L_TEX-printed EHDM specification is given in Appendix
A; a cross-reference from identifiers to the module in which they are declared is
given in Appendix B; Appendix C reproduces the summary from the EHDM proof-
chain analysis for the result corresponding to Corollary 2. All the material in the
Appendices was generated directly by the EttDM system.
Since the specification language of EItDM is a rather rich, strongly typed higher-
order logic, it was possible to cast the model presented in the previous chapter into
EHDM fairly directly. The specification of the basic process-control model is given
in the module simplo_machine (page 59). The semantic subtypes of EHDM allowed
us to specify the various types of cell in a very natural and convenient manner.
For example, CT, the type corresponding to the active-task cells is specified as the
subtype of C (the type of all cells) satisfying (Ac : cell_type(c) _ sensor_cell). We
can then define the signature of the function task as CT _ task_fn and the EHDM
system will ensure that applications of the form task(c) occur only in contexts where
c can be proven to satisfy the subtype predicate for CT. These proof obligations
are called type-correctness-conditions (or tcc's for short) and are placed in system-
generated modules whose names end in _tcc. The definition of the function step, for
example, causes two such tcc's to be generated in the module simple_machine_tcc
(page 62). This latter module contains several other tcc's, including three that
are required to demonstrate the nonemptiness of the subtypes introduced, one that
31
32 Chapter 3. Specification and Verification in EHDM
is necessary to demonstrate the well-foundedness of the recursive definition for the
function run, 1 and two others that are similar to those just discussed for step. EItDM
provides a tool called the proof-chain analyzer that checks whether a verification is
complete. Among the conditions that it enforces is the requirement that all tcc's be
proven.
System-generated tcc modules automatically include trivial proof declarations
for the formulas concerned. When these automatically generated proof declarations
do not suffice to establish their corresponding theorem, the user must construct
more elaborate proof declarations in another module. (Being system generated,
and crucial to the type-correctness of the specification, tcc modules are protected
against modification by the user.) The three such declarations needed in this case
are given in the module s±mple_machine_tcc_proofs (page 64). A similar naming
convention is applied to other modules containing proofs for tcc's. In order to
satisfy the nonemptiness requirements on subtypes, we introduce three constants
corresponding to an arbitrary sensor, actuator, and active-task cell respectively
(strictly, the last of these is unnecessary--actuators are also active tasks). In any
application of the specification, instantiations for these constants must be supplied.
We do not define the relation G in the EnDM specification; the simpler relation G
is sufficient to state and derive all the results required. We introduce inizial_state
as an arbitrary constant of type szaze to serve as the initial value in the recursive
definition for the function run.
The rest of the specification in module simple_machine is a fairly direct translit-
eration of that given in Section 2.1, with one exception: the EHDM specification has
an extra argument for the function szep. This was intended to allow for the descrip-
tion of systems with a less rigid scheduling model than that eventually employed.
Thus, whereas Section 2.1 has
step(a,c) = a with [c := if c e Cs then sensor(c)(when(c)) else task(c)(a)],
the EHDM specification has
step(a,c,m) = a with [c := if c E Cs then sensor(c)(m) else task(c)(e)].
However, this latter version of the function is always used in the form
step(a, c, when(c)), so that it is equivalent to the first version.
The module sitaple_props (page 68) states and proves some simple consequences
of the previous definitions that are needed later. One, stay_correct_simple, is an
example of the type of condition that is often glossed over in conventional mathe-
matical presentations, such as that in Chapter 2. It states that if the output of cell
*The annotation "...by identity" in the recursive definition of run establishes identity as
the measure function for the recursion. The value of the measure function is required to be strictly
decreasing across recursive calls, and a tcc is generated to ensure that this is so.
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a is used as an input to cell c, then the value recorded for a immediately after it is
computed will still be the same when it is accessed (possible much later) in order
to be used in the computation of c. In the case of the simple machine, this result
is straightforward; it is less so in the case of the replicated machine (since failures
must be accounted for). In either case, this is the step that will require a modified
proof if the specification is adjusted to model systems that do not keep all cell values
for all time (see page 47).
The proof of stay_correct_simple is by induction. The particular form of
induction used is a variant of simple induction over the natural numbers. This
is stated as the higher-order theorem induction_m in the module natinduction
(page 66). This module states two other induction schemes; all three are derived
from a statement of Noetherian induction given by the axiom general_induction
in the module noetherian (page 65). Note that general_induction is the only
induction scheme stated as an axiom; all the others are theorems derived from this
single axiom. Notice, too, that the module noetherian has assumptions (stated in
the assuming clause) that must be discharged in any instantiation. The module
natinduction discharges these assumptions for its particular instantiation.
The next three modules, sets (page 71), cardinality (page 72), and
orderedsets (page 74), introduce concepts related to sets that are needed in order
to state the model for the replicated machine. Sets are modeled by their character-
istic predicates; the type of (the predicate representing) a given set is dependent on
the type supplied as the actual parameter to the sets module. The sets module
defines the basic set operations of union, intersection, subset, and the like, as higher-
order functions. Those unfamiliar with the use of higher-order logic in specifications
may find these definitions particularly interesting.
The module cardinality introduces the notion of the cardinality (size) of a set
and defines some of its properties axiomatically. Some of the axioms we use, for
example
Jau bl+ lan bl = + Ibl,
are valid only for finite sets. Accordingly, an assumption is attached to this module
to ensure that only finite types may be supplied as its actual parameter. The
EI-IDM proof-chain analyzer checks that module assumptions are discharged in any
instantiations before the overall verification is declared complete.
The module orderedsets defines the function m±n (the value of the smallest
element) on sets whose elements are drawn from a type with a suitable ordering
relation.
The replicated system model is developed in the module repl_machine (page 75).
The specification follows very closely that given in Section 2.2. As with the step
function of simple_machine, the functions voice, ss'cep, and rstep all take a third
argument in the EHDM specification, but are always used in a manner that is consis-
tent with the two-argument forms given earlier. Another slight difference is in the
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specification of the condition that majority voting is performed only for voted cells.
In the EHDM specification, this is given in the axiom for the vote function, rather
than in the definition of rstep. The two approaches are obviously equivalent, but if
we were to revise the EI_DM specification, we would change it to the alternate form
used in Section 2.2. The form currently employed suggests that the voter is always
applied, but only actually does a vote when the cell is a voted one; it would be more
natural to specify that the voter always votes, but is applied only when the cell is a
voted one.
The required property of the maj (majority vote) function is specified in the
axiom maj_ax. Note that by specifying this function relative to a set of component
machines, rather than relative to the values recorded by their states, we avoid the
need to introduce the concept of a multiset. The majority vote function used in
Section 2.2 is a partial function: it is undefined if an absolute majority does not
exist. Functions in EItDM are total, however: the maj function, for example, has
some value even when an absolute majority does not exist--we simply know nothing
about what that value may be. In order to make use ofmaj _ax, the verification must
always establish that the conditions for the existence of an absolute majority are
satisfied. Thus the distinction between a truly partial function and a total function
whose values are unconstrained when applied outside its domain is moot in this
case. 2
Module supports (page 79) introduces the functions foundation, support, and
commit'ted_to that are needed in the statement of the Consistency Theorem. Sub-
sidiary functions backup and critical_times are used in the definitions.
The module correc_:ness (page 84) defines the functions 0K and t401(, the predi-
cates safe and correc_c, and states the_result, which corresponds to the Consen-
sus Theorem, and is the main result proved in the verification. The definition for
safe given in the EHDM specification is weaker than that given in Section 2.3, and
so "che_resul"c is stronger than Theorem 1 of Section 2.3. The difference is that the
formal specification of safe(c) requires only that the replicated machine be MOK
for those cells a that transitively contribute input to c; the definition in Section 2.3,
on the other hand, requires that the replicated machine be MOK for c and for all
cells executed earlier than c. Clearly the cells that transitively contribute input to
2If f: A ---, B is a partial function and x E A a value outside the domain of definition of f,
then the term f(x) has no meaning. There are two ways to capture the useful properties of partial
functions in EHDM: one is to use a total function with signature A --* B, but to specify nothing
about its values outside its domain of definition. In this case, the term f(x) has some value, but
we don't know what it is. Expressions like x = y D f(z) = f(y) are meaningful, and true, however.
The other approach is to use a total function with signature A' ---* B where A' C A
is the true domain. The quotient function, for example, is defined this way in EI-IDM:
quotient: function[number,nznum --* number], where nznum is the type of nonzero numbers de-
fined as a subtype of numbers by the predicate (Az: z # 0). In this case, the term quotient(x,y) is
type-correct only if it can be proved that y # 0 in the context of its use.
35
e must all be executed earlier than e, and so the second condition implies the first.
The reason we used a stronger definition for safe in the traditional mathematical
presentation than we did in the formal specification is that the stronger definition al-
lows Theorem 1 to be proved by simple induction over the natural numbers, whereas
the weaker definition requires a proof by Noetherian induction over the structure of
the data/tow dependency graph. Noetherian induction is rather tricky to state and
carry out in quasi-formal notation (and may not be familiar to all readers) and so
we opted for the stronger notion of safe, and hence a weaker theorem, in the tra-
ditional development. In the truly formal notation of EHDM, it is no more difficult
to perform Noetherian than simple induction, and so we used the definition for safe
that gave the strongest theorem.
The module connect (page 87) establishes a crucial lemma called stay_correct
which states that if a is a cell that provides direct input to cell c, and if all component
machines that were OK at a computed the correct value for a, and if the replicated
machine is safe at c, then all component machines that are OK for c will have the
correct value for a available when they execute c. The proof of this lemma involves
a subsidiary lemma called stay_correct_.vepl that is the analog, for the replicated
machine, of the stay_correct_simple lemma discussed earlier. Like the earlier
lemma, this one is proved by induction, but requires a more complex induction
scheme than the previous case, because the induction must not proceed beyond the
point to which the component machine is known to be OK. 3
A key step in the proof of stay_correct is provided by the lemma
torch_carried, which establishes that if cell a provides input to cell c, and if the
replicated machine is safe at c, then there is some component machine that is OK
at both a and c (and hence it "carries the torch" of correct values over from a to
c). The proof of this property is the one place where we depend on the fact that we
are using majority voting (and hence that the intersection of the sets of component
machines OK at a and OK at c must be nonempty).
The three modules sensor_step (page 91), nonvoted_ztep (page 94), and
voted_step (page 97) establish the three cases for the inductive step in the proof of
the_result (i.e., Consensus Theorem) in module correctness_proof (page 103).
Unlike the traditional-style proof for the Consensus Theorem given in Section 2.3,
where strong induction over the schedule of cell executions is employed, the veri-
fication in EHDM uses Noetherian induction on the dependency structure recorded
in the relation G. This is the most natural induction scheme to employ in this
case and, as noted earlier, allows a stronger formulation of the theorem. Since the
statement of the Consensus Theorem has the form of an implication, we actually
3The type C of cells is imphcitly defined to be infinite by the module simple..machine, since the
when and sched functions constrain it to be bijective with the naturals. The specification would be
improved if the bijection were established with a finite initial subset of the naturals. In this case,
the inductive proof of stay_correct_simple would also require revision.
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employ a specialized form of Noetherian induction called mod_£nduction that is tai-
lored to this case. The statement and proof of rood_induction appear in the module
noetherian.
The three modules concerned with the establishingthe inductivestepfor the
proof of the_result each prove a lemma which states,for the case of the cellc
considered(i.e.,a sensorcell,a nonvoted active-taskcell,and a voted cell,respec-
tively),that ifthe replicatedmachine is safeat c, and correctat allcellsa that
provideinput to c,then the replicatedmachine willbe correctat c. The proofsof
theseresultsessentiallyfollowfrom applicationsof the definitionsof the functions
step, sstep, vote, rstep, rrun, and rrunto, but are somewhat tediousin EHDM
sinceitstheorem proverlacksa rewriter:numerous lemmas are requiredto break
the proof down intomanageable pieces,each involvingthe applicationofjustone
or two definitions.
Finally, the module outputs contains the spedfication and proof for the formula
actuators_correct, which corresponds to Corollary 1 in Section 2.3.
The complete verification of the__result requires the mechanized checking of 93
proofs (in addition, there are 9 automatically generated tcc proofs that fail; these
are supplanted by successful proofs among the 93) and takes about 7 minutes on
a Sun SPARCstation 2. The terse proof-chain analysis for the_result is given in
Appendix C. The effort required to formally specify and verify the model in EttDM
was between three and four man-weeks.
Chapter 4
Reconciliation with the LaRC
Model
In this chapter we explain the connection between our model and that developed
by Di Vito, Butler and CaldweU of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) [9]; for
brevity, we will generally refer to this as the "LaRC model."
A major difference between our model and the LaRC model is that we allocate
the elementary units of activity to a single-level structure of cells, whereas the LaRC
model considers a hierarchy of subframes, frames and cycles (in ascending order).
Thus, in our model, cells are drawn from a simple type C, whereas in the LaRC
model the units of activity (which we will call "LaRC-cells") are represented by
triples which we write as [p, f, s], where p is the cycle, 1 f is the frame, and s is the
subframe. There are an indefinite number of cycles, M frames, and frame f has
My subframes. If we let INk denote the first k natural numbers, then we require
p E l_, f E INM, and s E INMI.: The sequence of frames repeats to form cycles;
hence the properties of the LaRC model are primarily specified in terms of the last
two components of the LaRC triples. Dataflow dependencies are represented by a
relation --* on these pairs, where
[L d [g,t]
means that subframe s of frame f supphes input to subframe t of frame g. If
f >gV(f=gAs > t)
1We use the variable p, suggesting period, rather than c, suggesting cycle, to avoid confusion
with c as a cell.
_This is an example of a dependent type: a type that depends on the value of a variable. EHDM
has dependent typing, but lacks a syntax for stating the product type required here. A more
advanced specification language under development at SRI permits this type definition to be stated
directly.
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then the input comes from [f, s]'s execution in the previous cycle. The directed
graph associated with _ is called the task graph.
The second major difference between the LaRC model and ours is that we as-
sociate voting with individual cells, whereas the LaRC model treats voting as a
separate activity performed at the end of each complete frame. The LaRC model
employs a predicate VP (for Voting Pattern) to indicate what results are to be voted
in each frame: VP(f,s,g) is true just in case the result of subframe s in frame f is
voted at the end of frame g.
The association of votes with frames in the LaR.C model renders it strictly weaker
than our model: we can model any system that can be represented within the LaRC
model, but we can also model systems (for example, those having votes elsewhere
than at the end of the frame) that cannot be represented within the LaRC model.
In order to substantiate the first of these claims (the second is self-evident), we now
indicate how the LaRC model can be represented within our formulation.
To do this, we introduce a new "voting" cell at the end of every frame in the
LaRC task graph and, to a first approximation, we add an arc to the task graph
between each (regular) cell and the voting cell of the frame that votes that cell's
value; we also replace those dataflow references to the value of the original cell made
by ceils scheduled in frames later than one that votes its value by references to the
value of the voting cell. We say "in principle" because the process is complicated
when a value is voted by more than one frame. In this case, the voting cells of the
later frames vote on the previously voted value, not on the value of the original cell;
similarly, any references to the value always retrieve the most recently voted version.
(This is because there really is only one copy of the value).
Figure 4.1 gives a pictorial representation of the transformation just described.
In the figure, vertical dashed lines indicate frame boundaries, and the left to right
order of cells on the page suggests their temporal order of execution. The top image
portrays an unvoted system with three frames and two subtasks in each frame; the
numbered arcs indicate the dataflow dependencies. The lower two images portray
the system after transformation to frame-based voting systems. The double circles
represent the new voting tasks and the unnumbered arcs that curve below the line
of circles represent the dataflow dependencies of these new voting tasks. The middle
image portrays "continuous voting" (see Section 4.1.1), in which all data are voted
every frame---hence each voting task has a link back to the previous voting task in
order to access the previously voted values of earlier tasks. Arcs corresponding to the
original dataflow references retain the same numbering scheme in this transformed
portrayal. Observe that arc number 7, for example, no longer reaches back to
a task several frames earlier, but only to the previous voting task. The bottom
image portrays the system after transformation to a frame-based voting system
using "cyclic voting" (see Section 4.1.2), in which each frame votes only the data
generated in that frame. Here, arc 7 must still reach back to the frame containing
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Figure 4.1: Representation of Frame-Based Voting
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the task of interest, but the data is acquired from the voting task of the frame
concerned.
Formal description of the transformation is complicated by the need to take care
of the details. We identify the cells of our model with the triples [p, f, s] of the
LaRC task graph, together with an initialization cell and the special voting cells;
we denote the initialization cell by c_, and the voting cell at the end of frame g of
cycle q by v(q,g). The basic datafiow connections _ of the LaRC task graph give
rise to edges in our graph G as follows:
([p,f,s],[q,g,t]) e -G iff If, s] _ [g,t] and
p=qA{ f <gV (f=gAs<t)
V
p=q-lA{ f>gv
Cells that would otherwise be dependent on frame -1 instead make reference to the
initialization cell:
(ci,[O,g,t])eC iff If, s]--+ [g,t]A(f >gV(f--gAs > t)).
The execution schedule for the LaRC model is implicit in the frame structure:
all the subframes for frame 0 are executed in order, then those for frame 1, and
so until the last subframe of frame M - 1, at which point a new cycle starts over
at subframe 0 of frame 0. If we let K(f) I-1= _g=0 Mg denote the total number of
subframes in the first f frames of the task graph, then we require
and
when(cl) = O,
when([p,f,s]) = p × (K(M) + M) + (K(f) + f) + s + 1
when(v(q,g)) = q × (K(M) + M) + (K(g) + g) + Mg + 1.
We define orderings > and > over (cycle,frame) pairs based on their position in
the execution sequence:
(p,f) > (q,g) if(p > q) V (p= q A f > g), and
(p, f) _> (q, g) if(p>q) V(p=q/Xf_>g).
We also use the inverse relations < and < whenever convenient and extend the
relations to voted cells by the convention
v(q,g) <_ v(r,h) iff (q,g) <<(r,h).
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A voting cell v(q,g) is a candidate voting cell for ordinary cell [p, f, s] if VP(f, s, g),
and either q = p A g _> f or q = p + 1 A g < f; the candidate cell that is least with
respect to the _< ordering is the primary voting cell for [p, f, s], the others are
secondary voting cells for [p, f, s].
An arc ([p, f, s], v(q,g)) is added to G when V(q.g) is the primary voting cell for
[p, f, s]. An arc (v(q.g), v(r,h)) is added to G when v(r,h) is a secondary voting cell for
[p, f, s], and v(q,g) is the largest candidate voting cell for [p, f, s] with respect to the
_> ordering such that (q,g) < (r,h). Finally, we replace arcs ([p,f,s],[q,g,t])e G,
by arcs (v(_,h), [q, g, t]) where v(_,h) is the largest candidate voting cell for [p, f,s]
with respect to the >_ ordering such that (r, h) < (q, g).
We claim that the transformation just described will cast an instance of the
LaRC model into an instance of our model in a way that preserves its essential
properties. Despite its notational complexity, the transformation is really quite
simple: it "unrolls" the cyclic schedule of the LaRC model into fiat structure that
we require, and it encodes the frame-based voting of the LaRC model in the voted
cells of our model.
4.1 Specific Voting Patterns
In the following sections we will derive results similar to those of [9, Section 14]
for specific voting patterns. We will use the general character of the transformation
between the LaRC model and ours described above, but will not undertake literal
translations of the LaRC Theorems. Instead, we will state what we consider to be
the main thrust of the LaRC Theorems directly in the terms of our model, and will
conduct our proofs within that context. In this way, we avoid the tedious labor of the
transformation, preserve the clarity of the presentation of each result, and increase
its generality of application. We claim, but do not prove, that if the statements of
the Theorems of [9, Section 14] are transformed in the way described above, then
the resulting "mapped" theorems will be special cases of those given below.
All we require to state our first two results is a notion of "frame." The idea is
that all cells belong to exactly one frame; the members of each frame are executed
sequentially; the last cell executed in each frame is a voted cell, and no other cells
are voted.
Thus we introduce the set
• F = {0, 1,...,Ifl} of frames, with mapping
• frame: C _ F, and equivalence relation
• ,..,CCxC
where
a ,_ c _f frame(a) = frame(c).
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Thus frame(c) denotes the frame to which cell c belongs, and a _ c indicates that
a and c both belong to the same frame. The requirement that all the members of
a frame are executed in sequence, with no members of other frames intervening, is
simply stated by the requirement that the derived function
, frame-sched: M --+ F,
given by
frame-sched(m) a°Jframe(sehed(m)),
should be monotonic increasing.
The final cell executed in a frame is the only voted cell in that frame:
defCv = {clVa:a ~ c when(a) < when(c)}.
It is convenient to let voted-cell(f) denote the voted cell for frame f.
Equipped with these definitions, we can state and prove results about increas-
ingly less restricted frame-based voting patterns.
4.1.1 Continuous Voting
The idea here is that the entire state of the replicated machine is voted every frame.
Thus, any cell that requires a value from an earlier frame need only refer to the
voting cell of the immediately preceding frame. Hence, our formalization is:
Definition 1 (Continuous Voting) A replicated machine performs continuous
voting if:
(a,c) e G D a ,_ cV a = voted-cell(frame(c) - 1).
We have
Theorem 2 If a majority of machines is working throughout each consecutive pair
of frames, then the replicated machine is safe under continuous voting.
Proof.' For any cell c, we need to ensure that a majority of component machines
are working throughout the period from committed-to(c) to when(c). The definition
of continuous voting ensures
when(voted-cell(frame(c)- 1)) _< committed-to(c)
and
when(c) < when(voted-cell(frame(c))).
Hence, the requirement that a majority of machines are working throughout each
consecutive pair of frames is sufficient to ensure that the replicated machine is safe.
[]
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4.1.2 Cyclic Voting
The idea here is that cells in frame f never refer to cells from frames earlier than
f-e, where e is a parameter to the design. Further, when cells make "out of frame"
references, it is only to voted cells.
Definition 2 (Cyclic Voting) A replicated machine performs cyclic voting with
period e if:
(a, c) 6 G D a ~ c V (a = voted-cell(frame(e) - k) h 1 < k < e).
(Obviously, there is also a well-formedness condition: frame(e) - k > 0.) Notice
that cyclic voting reduces to continuous voting when e = 1.
Theorem 3 If a majority of machines are working throughout each sequence of e+ 1
consecutive frames, then the replicated machine is safe under cyclic voting.
Proof: For any cell c, we need to ensure that a majority of component machines
are working throughout the period from committed-to(c) to when(c). The definition
of cyclic voting ensures
when(voted-cell(frame(c)- e ) ) <_ committed-to(c)
and
when(c) < when(voted-cell(frame(c))).
Hence, the requirement that a majority of machines are working throughout each
consecutive sequence of e + 1 of frames is sufficient to ensure that the repficated
machine is safe. D
4.1.3 Optimal Voting
In this section, we examine conditions that allow a replicated machine to vote as
little data as possible, and as seldom as possible, yet still be able to recover from
transient failures in a fixed amount of time.
The general condition is very simple to state, but not very interesting:
Lemma 1 If there exists a constant B such that
Vc: when(voted-cell(frame(e)- B)) <_ committed-to(c),
and a majority of machines are working throughout each sequence of B + 1 consec-
utive frames, then the replicated machine is safe.
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Proof: This result follows by the same argument used in Theorem 3. []
The conditions become more interesting when we consider cyclic schedules. It
is natural and convenient to think of cyclic schedules as generated by repeatedly
"unrolling" a more basic schedule for a single cycle. We assume such basic schedules
to be composed of "basic cells" of the form [f, s] where f is the frame, and s the
subframe. A relation --, defines the datafiow relationships among the basic cells:
[f, s] --* [g, t] means that subframe s of frame g provides input to subframe t of frame
g. Cells are executed in order by frames, and in subframe order within frames. As
before, we assume there are M frames.
So far, this model is the same as the LaRC model [9]; a difference is that here
we allow arbitrary basic cells to be designated as voted cells, whereas the LaRC
model considers voting to take place at the end of each frame and indicates that
cell [f, s] is voted in frame n by VP(f, s, n), As explained at the beginning of this
chapter, there is a straightforward transformation from the standard LaRC model
to the variant used here.
The frame length of a step [f, s] _ [g,
0 if
M if
g-f if
M + (g- f) if
A path in the basic schedule is a sequence
such that
t] is defined by
f =gAs<t,
f =gAs>t,
f < g, and
f>g
of cells
< If, [g,t],..., [h,u]>
If, [g,t] -,... -, [h,
The frame length of a path is the sum of the frame lengths of its individual steps.
We "unroll" the basic model to yield cells of the form [p, f, s] where p is the
cycle, and f and s are the frame and subframe as before. The graph G comprises
pairs of cells ([p, f, s], [q, g, t]) such that [f, s] ---, [g, t] in the basic model and
p=q if (f<g)
p=q-1 if (f>g)
A cell [p, f, s] is voted if [f, s] is designated
[p, f, s] is a sensor cell if it has indegree zero
such that [g,t] _ [f,s]).
The frame-time of a cell is its position in
v(f =ghs<t)
V(f =gAs>_t)
as a voted cell in the basic schedule;
in G (i.e., if there is no basic cell [g, t]
the execution sequence:
frame-time([p,f,s]) = p x M + f;
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the frame length of an arc (_, f, s], [q,g, t])in the graph G is defined to be
frame-time([q, g, t]) - frame-time([p, y, s]).
Notice that the construction ensures that this value is nonnegative, and that it equals
the frame length of [f,s] _ [g,t] in the basic schedule. A path in the (unrolled)
schedule is a sequence of cells
< [p,f,s],[q,g,t],...,[r,h,u] >
such that each consecutive pair of cells are connected by an arc in the graph G. The
frame length of this path is defined as
frame-time(It, h, u]) - frame-time([p, f, s]).
It is easy to see that this equals the sum of the frame lengths of the individual arcs,
and that it also equals the frame length of the basic path
< [f,s],[g,t]...[h,u] >.
A path
< [p,/, s], [q,g, t], . . . , >
is a commitment path if
• The cell [p, f, s] is either a sensor cell or a voted cell, and
• No other cells in the sequence are voted, except possibly the last.
Then we have
Lemma 2 If there exists a bound B on the frame-length of any commitment-path,
and a majority of machines are working throughout each sequence of B + 1 consec-
utive frames, then the replicated machine is safe.
Proof: If
< [p,f,s],[q,g,t],...,[r,h,u] >
is a commitment-path, then
[p, f, s] • support([r, h, u]).
If no commitment-path has frame length longer than B, it follows that
when(voted-cell(frame(It, h, u] - B ) ) ) <_ committed-to(It, h, u])
and the result follows by the previous lemma. []
The existence of the bound B is determined by the presence of vote-free cycles
(loops) in the basic task graph:
46 Chapter 4. Reconciliation with the LaRC Model
Lemma 3 There exists a bound B on the frame-length of any commitment-path if
and only if all cycles in the basic task graph contain at least one voted cell.
Proof: Suppose there is no such bound B. Then there are commitment-paths of
arbitrary frame lengths--and therefore of arbitrary lengths, since the frame length
of any individual step is fixed. Since the number of basic cells is fixed and finite, it
follows that there must exist a commitment-path of the form
<...[p,f,s]...[q,f,s]... >
in which the components of some unvoted basic cell [f, s] are repeated and no voted
cells appear in between. The construction of the graph G is such that this can only
happen if there is a cycle
[f,s]-+--- --+If,S]
in the task graph comprising only unvoted cells.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the basic task graph contains a cycle
[f, s] [f, s]
comprising only unvoted cells. Then a commitment-path can be constructed con-
taining a segment derived from enough iterations of this basic cycle that the frame-
length exceeds any fixed bound B. []
Combining these lemmas, we obtain
Theorem 4 Recovery from transient faults is possible if and only if there are no
vote-free cycles in the basic task graph. Further, if all paths of the form
[f, s] --* [g, t] --* ... _ [h, u],
where at most the first and last elements are voted, have path lengths no longer than
B, and if a majority of machines are working throughout each sequence of B + 1
consecutive frames, then the replicated machine is safe.
Proof: Combine the preceding three lemmas. []
Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusions
We begin with a consideration of possible extensions to this work. These extensions
fall into four categories, listed in order of increasing complexity:
• Proof of additional properties within the current model,
• Modification of the current model in order to enhance its abstractness,
• Development of more concrete models on top of the current model, and
• Significant extensions to the model in order to encompass a wider class of
systems.
We consider each of these categories in turn.
A topic where additional proofs would expose the underlying requirements more
clearly concerns the retention of stored values. The current model treats the system
state as a function recording the values of all cells encountered during the entire
lifetime of the system. Obviously this is not how we expect the system to be imple-
mented. It is intuitively clear that the only cells whose values need to be retained
axe those which have been computed but not yet used--that is, the value of cell c
needs to be retained only for the interval from when(c) to max{when(a)l(c , a) e -G}.
This can be specified by modifying the definition of the basic function step.
Currently, we have
step(a, c) _f a with [c := if c E Cs then sensor(c)(when(c)) else task(c)(a)].
This definition can be replaced by two axioms specifying a modified function step1:
step'(a, c)(c) = if c e Cs then sensor(c)(when(c)) else task(c)(a)
and
Ya, b : (a, b) E -G A when(a) < when(c) < when(b) D step'(a, c)(a) = a(a).
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To establish that step' is an adequate replacement for step we need to prove that
the actuator commands are the same in both cases.
There are two ways to carry out this proof. One would establish a variant
specification for simple._ach±ne using step' instead of step, and would prove that
actuator outputs are the same in both cases--that is, it would verify a theorem
of the form runto(c)(c) = runto'(c)(c). This approach would leave the existing
specification and verification unchanged but would require a fairly extensive new
verification that would mirror, in many respects, the verification already performed.
The other approach would modify repl__achine to use step' instead of step and
would then carry this additional complication along in the proof of fault masking.
This approach is probably the simplest, since the definition of step is used only five
times in proofs concerning the replicated machine.
A topic where increased abstraction in the current model and verification would
expose underlying requirements more clearly is the choice of voting strategy. The
current model is firmly based on majority voting, but other strategies such as plural-
ity voting have attractions. As long as the working machines constitute an absolute
majority, plurality voting exhibits the same behavior as majority voting. If the
working machines should fail to form an absolute majority, however, the majority-
voted system will break down, whereas a plurality-voted system may break down
or may not, depending on whether enough of the failed machines agree on a com-
mon, wrong value to win the plurality vote. There seems to be no way to measure
the likelihood of this latter event, nor any sound way to engineer a system so that
failed machines are unlikely to agree, and so we do not advocate the use of plurality
voting as a way to enhance the claimed reliability of the system. There seems little
harm, however, and possibly some value, in using voting strategies that are more
robust than strict majority--so that there is at least some chance the system may
continue to work even after an explosion, or other catastrophic event, has rendered
10-9 irrelevant. 1
These considerations provide the motivation for a more careful examination of
the voting and fault-model assumptions required for the Consensus Theorem to
hold. There are two places in the present development where the properties of
strict majority voting are employed. One, noted in Chapter 3, is in the proof of
torch_carried, the other is in the proof of voce._lemma in module vol:ed_step.
It would be very worthwhile to revisit these proofs and to determine a minimal
characterization of the properties actually required of the voting function in order
for the fault-masking properties to be retained. (Majority is a strict requirement for
the torch_carried property, but there seem to be other ways to conduct the part of
the proof in which this property is used.) The ability to conduct such investigations
is one of the benefits of a truly formal development: the axiomatic and definitional
_Paul Miner of NASA LaRC first drew these considerations to our attention.
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basis of the development is known precisely, and the effect of controlled variations
can be rigorously explored. 2
A prime candidate for a more concrete model to be constructed on top of the one
developed here is that of Di Vito, Butler and Caldwell. As indicated in Chapter 4,
the main results proved for that model can also be derived from ours; it would be
interesting to formally verify those derivations. At a later stage in this program of
work, when an actual design for a reliable computing platform for DFCS has been
developed, it will be valuable to attempt to instantiate our model for that design.
The characteristics of some potential system designs cannot be seen as instan-
tiations of our model: it will be necessary to significantly revise and extend the
model in order to accommodate such designs. Among the revisions and extensions
that would be most illuminating are those that break the lock-step synchronization
of task executions in the component machines. One extension would still require
the same workload for each component machine, but would allow them to execute
different schedules. Obviously there are constraints that require a notion of "consis-
tency" to be satisfied among schedules--they must synchronize for votes and must
not deadlock, for example. The practical benefit of allowing different schedules on
different channels is that simultaneous transient failures of several channels, such as
a lightning strike might induce, will be less likely to all affect the activations of a
single task; instead, the damage will be shared among several different tasks, and
all may still be executed by a majority of working processors.
Another extension would introduce different workloads for different machines.
This allows different quantities of replication for different activities and permits
better utilization of resources. For example, one really critical activity may run
on all processors, another less critical one may run on only three, while another,
presumably unimportant, task may run on but a single machine.
So much for future extensions; we now turn to a consideration of the significance
of the work actually performed. The work described is just one of the first steps in
a much larger program and it would be premature to evaluate the overall program
at this stage. We can, however, ask what the model developed here contributes to
a science of DFCS design, and we can ask what further value is contributed by its
formal specification and verification.
Clearly, our model addresses only a small fragment--redundancy management--
of the overall problem of DFCS design, and is a highly abstracted representation of
2It may seem moot to explore the circumstances under which a Consensus Theorem can hold with
less than _2 working channels when the underlying Byzantine fault tolerant sensor distribution
and clock synchronization algorithms require _ working channels. Our response is that it would3
be worthwhile to investigate the behavior of these Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms when fewer
than the required channels are available. It should be possible to tolerate nonByzantine failures
with only _2 working channels, but it is unknown whether the standard Byzantine algorithms
do so. There has, however, been some investigation of algorithms that tolerate multiple failure
modes [58, 59].
5O Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusions
that fragment. Small though that fragment may be, however, the evidence cited in
Section 1.2 suggests that it is one of the most crucial problems; if managed poorly,
redundancy can reduce, rather than enhance, the overall reliability of a DFCS.
Recall the summary of Mackall [23, pp. 40-41] quoted on page 8, and which reads
in part:
"... qualification of such a complex system as this, to some given level
of reliability, is difficult ... [because] the number of test conditions be-
comes so large that conventional testing methods would require a decade
for completion. The fault-tolerant design can also affect overall sys-
tem reliability by being made too complex and by adding characteristics
which are random in nature, creating an untestable design.
"... reducing complexity appears to be more of an art than a science
and requires an experience base not yet available. If the complexity is
required, a method to make system designs more understandable, more
visible, is needed."
The purpose of the work described here (and of the larger program) is precisely to
address these pleas for testable designs, purged of "random characteristics," and
which are more "understandable, more visible."
We contend that our model shows that certain principles of design--Byzantine
fault tolerant distribution of sensor samples, loosely synchronized execution, ma-
jority voting of all actuator outputs, and periodic majority voting of internal
state data--provide predictable behavior that masks faults and provides transient-
recovery. These principles of design are encoded in the axioms and definitions of
our model; the conclusion is derived by mathematical reasoning from that basis.
Other models have been devised that address similar problems. A general
method, known rather misleadingly as the "state-machine approach" for construct-
ing reliable systems from unreliable components that periodically vote their results
was developed by Lamport in a series of classic papers [60-62] (see also Schneider's
tutorial [63]). The development here can be seen as a modification of Lamport's
"state-machine" approach to the case where voting is performed intermittently.
The model most similar to our is, of course, that of Di Vito, Butler and Cald-
well [10,9]. The formal connection between the two models was discussed in Chap-
ter 4; here we consider less tangible issues--style, abstractness, and the influence of
formal verification.
A maxim usually attributed to Einstein holds that a theory should be "as simple
as possible---but no simpler." In our domain, simplicity is closely related to the ab-
stractness of the model considered: the advantage of abstraction is that it reduces
a problem to its simplest form and exposes its essential properties to scrutiny, un-
cluttered by extraneous matter; the danger is that too much is left out, so that the
model fails to capture those aspects of reality that are of interest. When formal
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verificationis undertaken, abstraction has economic, as well as philosophical con-
sequences: it will generally be easier, and hence require less resources, to verify an
abstract model than a more concrete one. Furthermore, the abstract model should
have wider applicability, and hence the cost of its verification can be amortized over
more instantiations. Of course, the cost of one instantiation must be borne in order
to reach the level of detail considered in the more concrete model.
Our model is considerably more abstract than that of Di Vito, Butler and Cald-
well; we explained the reasons for our choices in Section 1.3.1 and considered the
reconciliation between the two models in Chapter 4. For the purpose of formal ver-
ification, we consider our model to have distinct advantages: it has been subjected,
essentially without change, to formal specification and mechanical proof checking
in EHDM, whereas we believe that direct verification of the LaRC model would be
a considerable challenge. Whether the added concreteness of the LaRC model ren-
ders it a more effective specification for human review is something we leave to our
readers to decide.
The remaining question we consider is whether formal specification and me-
chanical proof checking added anything of value to the quasi-formal description and
proof presented in Chapter 2. The first thing to note is that the description and
proof given in Chapter 2 were heavily influenced by the formal verification--both
before and after the latter was performed. It was influenced even before the formal
verification was attempted because the model was constructed with formal specifi-
cation and verification (in EItDM) in mind. Hence, it is expressed directly in terms
of (higher-order) functions; the LaRC model, on the other hand, uses vectors, se-
quences, sets, and iterated conjunction operators. These can all be expressed in
terms of (higher-order) functions and we would not hesitate to use them where they
contribute to clarity--on the other hand, we generally prefer to do without these
constructs when a comparably simple specification can be found that is expressed
directly in terms of functions. After the formal verification had been performed, we
revised some of the definitions and the proof of Chapter 2 in order to bring them
more closely into line with the corresponding EHDM versions.
There is one improvement derived from the formal verification that we did not
retrofit to development of Chapter 2: this is a stronger formulation of the main
Consensus Theorem. The Consensus Theorem is stated as
/d safe(c), then
Vj E R: OK(j)(e) _ good-value(j, c).
where
safe(c) def (Va: when(a) <_ when(c) _ MOK(a)).
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In the EIIDM verification, the Theorem was strengthened by giving a weaker
(recursive) definition for safe:
safe(c) defMOK(e) A (Va: (a, c) E G D safe(a)).
The stronger theorem requires only that the replicated machine is MOK for all
those cells that transitively contribute input to cell c; the weaker form requires it
be MOK for all cells executed prior to c.
Obviously, the stronger theorem could have been stated and proved in the quasi-
formal development just as well as the weaker one. The significant point, however, is
that it was the weaker formulation, and correspondingly a proof by simple induction,
that arose most naturally in the quasi-formal development. In formal verification,
the familiar convenience of simple induction is less of a driving force, and we were
led to contemplate the stronger theorem, which requires a more difficult Noetherian
induction.
The main benefit that we see accruing from the mechanically checked verification
is the precision with which the underlying assumptions are now known. Formally,
this basis consists of 18 axioms (of which only 11 are directly concerned with the
model, while the remaining 7 deal with supporting concepts such as cardinality), and
15 definitions (which provide only conservative extensions in Ett DM). Informally, we
have acquired a much better appreciation of the issues concerning the retention of
stored values, and of the way in which fault masking is dependent on the properties
of majority (as opposed to other kinds of) voting. As described above, we are now
in a position to investigate these issues formally.
In future work, we hope to explore these issues, and also to extend our formal
specification and verification toward the behavior of a realistic operating system
that will implement the fault-masking techniques modeled here. The next step will
be to combine the model used here with that for clock synchronization [38], in order
to consider the more realistic case of replicated computers that are synchronized
only within some bound _, and in which computation and communication take a
certain amount of time.
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Appendix A
bTEX- printed Specification
Listings
The following specification listings were formatted and converted to mathematical
notation automatically using the ERDM _.TEX-printer.
simple_machine: Module
Exporting all
Theory
n: Var nat
M: Type is nat
m: Var M
C, D: Type
a, c: Var C
cell_types: Type = (sensor_cell, actuator_cell, task_cell)
cell_type: function[C _ cell_types]
Cs : Type from C with ( A c : cell_type(c) = sensor_cell)
CA : Type from C with ( A c : cell_type(c) = actuator_cell)
CT : Type from C with ( A c : cell_type(c) _ sensor_cell)
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start_cell: Cs
arb_task: CT
arb_actuator: CA
(.1,.2) e G: function[C, C -* bool]
sensor_ax: Axiom ( 3 a: (a, c) E G) _ -,(c in Cs)
sched: function[M --* C]
when: function[C --* M]
Gbar_when: Axiom (a, c) E G D when(a) < when(c)
sched_when_ax: Axiom (sched(rn) = a) _ (m = when(a))
dowhen_pos: Axiom when(c) > 0
p, q: Var M
unique_when: Lemma p _ q D sched(p) _ sched(q)
previous: function[C -_ C] == ( A c: sched(pred(when(c))))
sched_whendemrna: Lemma a = sched(when(a))
when_scheddemma: Lemma m = when(sched(ra))
dowhen_previous: Lemma when(previous(c)) = pred(when(c))
state: Type is function[C _ D]
initiM_state: state
s, t: Var state
sensor_fn: Type is function[M _ D]
sensor: function[Cs -* sensorfn]
t_k_fn: Type is function[state _ D]
task: function[CT -_ task_fn]
simple_machine 61
dependency: Axiom
c in CT A (Va: (a,c) E G D s(a) = t(a))
D task(c)(s) = task(c)(t)
step: function[state, C, M --* state] =
(_8, c,m:s
with [(c):=
if c in Cs then sensor(c)(m) else task(c)(s) end if])
identity: function[M _ nat] == ( A m : m)
run: Reeursive function[M _ state] =
(),m:
if m = 0 then initial_state else step(run(m - 1), sched(m), m) end if)
by identity
runto: function[C ---*state] =-- ( A c: run(when(c)))
Proof
sched_when_proof: Prove sched_whenAemma from
sched_when_ax {m *-- when(a)}
when_sched_proof: Prove when_scheddemma from
sched_when_ax {a _ sched(m)}
dowhen_prev_proof: Prove dowhen_previous from
when_schedAemma {m _ pred(when(c))}
unique_when_proof: Prove unique_when from
when_schedAemma {m _ p}, when_schedAemma {m _ q}
End simple_machine
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simple_machine_tcc: Module
Using simple_machine
Exporting all withsimple_machine
Theory.
m: Var naturainumber
a: Var C
c: Var C
s: Var function[C _ D]
t: Var function[C _ D]
sensors_TCCl: Formula ( 3 c : cell_type(c) = sensor_cell)
actuators_TCCl: Formula ( 3 c : cell_type(c) = actuator_cell)
active_tasks_TCCl: Formula ( 3 c : cell_type(c) # sensor_cell)
dependency_TCCl: Formula
(c in CT A (V a: (a,c) • G D s(a): t(a)))
D (ceil_type(c) # sensor_cell)
step_TCCl: Formula (c in Cs) D (ceU_type(c) = sensor_cell)
step_TCC2: Formula (_(c in Cs)) D (cell_type(c) # sensor_cell)
run_TCCl: Formula (-,(m = 0)) D (m - i >_ 0)
run_TCC2: Formula (-,(m = 0)) D identity(m) > identity(m - 1)
Proof
sensors_TCC 1_PROOF: Prove sensors_TCC 1
actuators_TCC1_PROOF: Prove actuators_TCC 1
active_tasks_TCCl_PROOF: Prove active_tasks_TCC1
dependency_TCC 1_PROOF: Prove dependency_TCC 1
step_TCC1-PROOF: Prove step_TCC1
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step_TCC2__PROOF: Prove step_TCC2
run_TCCI_PROOF: Prove run_TCC1
run_TCC2_PROOF: Prove run_TCC2
End simple_machine_tcc
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simple_machine_tcc_proofs: Module
Proof
Using simple..mackine_tcc
sensors_TCCl_PROOF: Prove sensors_TCC1 (c _- start_cell)
active_ta.sks_TCCl_PROOF: Prove active_tasks_TCC1 (c _ arb_task)
from distinct_cell_types
actuators_TCCl_PROOF: Prove actuators_TCC1 (c _- arb__ctuator)
End simp]e_machine_t cc_proofs
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noetherian: Module [dom: Type, <: function[dom, dom --* bool]]
Assuming
measure: Vat function[dora _ nat]
a, b: Var dom
well_founded: Formula
( 3 measure : a < b D measure(a) < measure(b))
Theory
p, A, B: Vat function[dom _ bool]
d, all, d2: Vat dom
general_induction: Axiom
(Vdl: (Vd_ : d_ < d, D p(d2)) D p(d,)) D (Vd: p(d))
d3, d4: Var dom
mod_induction: Theorem
(V d3, d4:d4 < d3 D A(d3) D A(d4))
A (Vdl: (Vdz: d2 < dl D (a(dl) A B(d_))) D B(dl))
D (Vd: A(d) D B(d))
Proof
mod_proof: Prove
modinduction {dl _ dl_pl, d3 _ dl_pl, d4 _ d2}
from general_induction {p ,-- ( ,k d: A(d) D B(d))}
End noetherian
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natinduction: Module
Theory
i, m, ml, n: Par nat
p: Var function[nat --_ bool]
induction: Theorem (p(0) A (V i: p(i) D p(i + 1))) D p(n)
induction_m: Theorem
p(m) A (Y i : i > m A p(i) D p(i + l)) D (V n : n > m D p(n))
hmited_induction: Theorem
(re<m1 Dp(m))A(Vi:i>mAi<-_lAp(i)Dp(i+l))
( v _ : _ >__ ^ _ < ,n_ _ p(n))
Proof
Using noetherian
prey: function[nat, nat _ bool] == ( A m, n : m + 1 = n)
instance: Module is noetherian[nat, prev]
x: Par nat
identity: function[nat _ nat] == ( A n : n)
discharge: Prove well_founded {measure _ identity}
ind_proof: Prove induction {i _ pred(dl@pl)} from
general_induction {d _ n, d2 _ i}
ind_m_proof: Prove induction_m {i _ i@pl + m} from
induction
{p_-- (Ax :p@c(x + m)),
n_ ifn>__m thenn-m else0end if}
limited_proof: Prove limited_induction {i _ i@pl} from
induction_m {p _ ( A x : x _<ml D p@c(x))}
End natinduction
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natinduction_tcc: Module
Using natinduction
Exporting all withnatinduction
Theory
m: Var naturalnumber
n: Var naturalnumber
ind_m_proof_TC C 1: Formula
(m_>0) A(n_>0) D(ifn_>m then n-melse0end if_>0)
Proof
ind_m_proof_TCCl_PROOF: Prove ind_m_proof_TCC1
End natinduction_tcc
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simple_props: Module
Using simple_machine, natinduction
Exporting wit hsimple_machine
Theory
a, c: Vat C
stay_correct_simple: Lemma
(a, c) E G D runto(previous(c))(a) = runto(a)(a)
simple_sensor_stepdemma: Lemma
c in Cs D runto(c)(c) = sensor(c)(when(c))
simple_step_lemma: Lemma
_(c in Cs) D runto(c)(c) = task(c)(run(pred(when(c))))
Proof
m: Var M
indstep: Lemma run(m)(a) = runto(a)(a) D run(m + 1)(a) = runto(a)(a)
indstep_proof: Prove indstep from
run {m _- m + 1},
step (s _- run(m), c _- sched(m + 1), m *-- m + 1},
unique_when {p _- when(a), q _- m Jr 1},
sched_whendemma
q: Var M
stay_simple_proof: Prove stay_correct_simple from
induction_m
{p _ ( A q: run(q)(a) = runto(a)(a)),
m _ when(a),
n _ when(previous(c))},
indstep {m _ i@pl},
sched_when_lemma {a ,-- previous(c)},
Gbar_when,
when_sched_lemma {m _ pred(when(c))}
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simple_sensor_step_proof: Prove simple_sensor_stepAemma from
run {._ _ when(c)),
step {s _- run(pred(when(c))), m _ when(c), c _- c),
sched_whenlemma {a _ c),
dowhen_pos
simple_stepAemma_proof: Prove simple_stepAemma from
run {m _ when(c)),
step {m _ when(c), s _ run(pred(when(c)))),
sched_whenAemma {a _ c),
dowhen_pos
End simple_props
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simple_props_tcc: Module
Using simple_props
Exporting all withsimple_props
Theory
c: Var simple_mackine.C
i: Var naturalnumber
simple_sensor_stepdemma_TCC 1: Formula
(c in Cs) D (cell_type(c) = sensor_cell)
simple_stepdemma_TCC 1: Formula
(-_(c in Us)) D (cell-type(c) _ sensor _cell )
Proof
simple_sensor_stepdemma_TCC 1_PROOF: Prove
simple_sensor_stepdemma_TCC 1
simple_stepdemma_TCCl_PROOF: Prove simple_stepdemma_TCC1
End simple_props_tcc
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sets:Module [T: Type]
Exporting all
Theory
set:Type isfunction[T--*bool]
x,y,z: Var T
a,b:Var set
.I U .2: function[set,set--*set]==
(_a,b: (_: a(x) v b(x)))
.1 N*2: function[set, set _ set] ==
(_,b: (_: a(_)^ b(_)))
*1 \ .2: function[set, set --* set] ==
(A.,b: (A_: _(_)^ _b(_)))
add: function[T, set _ set] == (Az,a: (Ay:x = y v a(y)))
{*i}: function[T _ set] == (Az: (A y: y = x))
*1 C_.2: function[set, set _ bool] =
(_a,b: (v z: _(z) _ b(z)))
.1 6.2: function[T, set ---, bool] == ( A z,b: b(z))
empty: function[set ---, bool] -- ( ha: (V x: _a(z)))
0: set == ( A x : false)
fullset: set == (A x : true)
extensionality: Axiom (V x : x E a = x E b) D (a = b)
End sets
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cardinality: Module [T: Type]
Using sets[T]
Exporting all
Assuming
x, y, z: Var T
N: Var nat
f: Var function[T-_ nat]
finite:Formula
( 3 N, f : ( V x,y : f(x) < N A (f(x) = f(y) _ x = y)))
Theory
a, b, c: Mar set
I* 1]: function[set --, nat]
card_ax: Axiom ]a U b] + ]an bJ = ]al + ]bI
card_subset: Axiom a C_b Dla] < ]b[
card_empty: Axiom la] = 0 ¢_ empty(a)
empty_prop: Lemma lal > 0 D (3 x : x E a)
card_prop: Lemma
a_CcAbC_cA2,]a I>lclA2*lb]>lc]DlaNb[>0
Proof
empty_prop_proof: Prove empty_prop {x _ x@p2} from
card_empty, empty
subset_union: Sublemma a C_c A b C_c D a t3 b C_ c
subset_union_proof: Prove subset_union from
*1 C_*2 {z *- z@p3, b _- c},
*1 C_*2 {z *---z@p3, a <---b, b *---c},
*1 c_ .2 {a _ a u b, b ,-- c}
m, n, p: Var nat
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twice_prop: Sublemma2*m>pA2*n>pDm+n>p
twice_proof: Prove twice_prop
card_proof: Prove caxd_prop from
twice_prop {m _ lal, n ,--Ibl, p _ Icl},
card_ax,
subset _union,
card_subset {a _ a U b, b _ c}
End cardinality
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orderedsets: Module [T: Type, <: function[T, T _ bool]]
Using sets[T]
Exporting min withsets[T]
Assuming
x, y, z: Vat T
reflexive: Formula z < z
transitive: Formula x _<y h y < z D x < z
antisymmetry: Formula x _< y A y < x D z = y
dichotomy: Formula x <_ y V y _< x
Theory
a: Var set
min: function[set --, T]
min_ax: Axiom min(a) E a h (Vx :x E a D min(a) _< x)
End orderedsets
repl_machine
repl_machine:Module
Using simple_machine,sets,cardinality
Exporting all withsimple_machine
Theory
n: Var nat
m: Var M
c: Var C
voted: Type from C
voted_ax: Axiom
(c in CA D c in voted) A (c in voted D -_(c in Cs))
r: nat
R: Type from nat with ( A n : n _< r)
i: Var R
F: function[R _ function[M --. bool]]
rstate: Type is function[R ---. state]
a, r: Var rstate
maj: function[rstate, C ---*D]
A: Var set[R]
x: Var D
maj_ax: Axiom
( 3 A: 2 • ]A[ > Ifullset[R][ A ( V i: i • A D a(i)(c) = x))
D maj(o', c)= x
vote: function[rstate, C, M _ rstate]
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vote_ax: Axiom
_(F(i)(m))
D vote(a, c, m)
= if c in voted
then a
with [(i)(c):= maj(a,c)]
else a
end if
sstep: function[rstate, C, M _ rstate]
sstep_ax: Axiom _(F(i)(m)) D sstep(a, c, m)(i) = step(a(i), c, m)
rstep: function[rstate, C, M _ rstate] ==
( A a, c, m : vote(sstep(a, c, m), c, m))
rrun: Recursive function[M -_ rstate] =
(Am:
if m=0
then ( A i : initial_state)
else rstep(rrun(m - 1), sched(m), m)
end if)
by identity
rrunto: function[C -* rstate] == ( A c : rrun(when(c)))
Proof
dishargedinite: Prove
finite[R] {f _ ( A i --* nat : i), N _- r) from
Rdnvariant {R_var _ x_c}
End repl_machine
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repl_machine_t cc: Module
Using repl_machine
Exporting all withrepl_machine
Theory
n: Var naturalnumber
m: Var naturalnumber
z: Var R
R_TCCI: Formula ( S n : n _< r)
rrun_TCCl: Formula (-_(m = 0)) D (m - 1 >_ 0)
rrun_TCC2: Formula (-.(m = 0)) D identity(m) > identity(m - 1)
Proof
R_TCCI_PROOF: Prove R_TCC1
rrun_TCCI_PROOF: Prove rrun_TCC1
rrun_TCC2__PROOF: Prove rrun_TCC2
End repl_machine_tcc
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repl.machine_tcc_proofs:Module
Proof
Using repl_machine_tcc
R_TCCI..PROOF: Prove R_TCC1 {n _ r)
End repl_machine_tcc_proofs
supports
supports:Module
Using repl..machine,orderedsets[M,naturalnumbers.<],sets[C]
Exporting support,committed_to
wit hrepl_machine,orderedsets[M,naturalnumbers.<],sets[C]
Theory
a, b, c: Var C
foundation: Recursive function[C --* set[C]] =
(Ac:
(Aa:
C'-'_
V ('_(cin voted V c in C$)
^ (3 b :(b,c)e _ ^ a E foundation(b)))))
by when
backup: function[C--+set[C]]=
(Ac:(A_:(_b:(b,c)e _ ^_efoundation(b))))
support: function[C_ set[C]]=
(A c :(A a :a E foundation(c)V (c in voted ^ a e backup(c))))
Gbar_support: Lemma (a,c) E _ D a E support(c)
in_own_support:Lemma c E support(c)
subset_support:Lemma
-,(ain voted)^ (a,c)E _ D support(a)C support(c)
S,T: Var set[C]
i:Var R
t,m: Var M
critical_times:function[C--*set[M]]--=
(Ac: (At: sched(t)E support(c)))
committed_to: function[C_ M] == (A c :rain(critical_times(c)))
commit_when_lemma: Lemma committed_to(c)<_when(c)
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commit_supportdemma: Lemma
a E support(c) D committed_to(c) <: when(a)
commit_Gbar..lemma: Lemma
(a, c) E G ^ -_(a in voted) D committed_to(c) __ committed_to(a)
Proof
discharge_reflexive: Prove reflexive
discharge_transitive: Prove transitive
discharge_antisymmetry: Prove antisymmetry
discharge_dichotomy: Prove dichotomy
support_backup: Sublemma a E support(c) = (c = a V a E backup(c))
support_backup_proof: Prove support_backup from
support,
backup {b _ b_p3},
foundation {b ,--- b_p2},
sensor_ax {a ,- b@P2 }
Gbar_support_prf: Prove Gbar_support from
support_backup, backup {b _ a}, foundation {c _- a}
in_own_support_proof: Prove in_own_support from
support_backup {a _ c}
found_support: Sublemma -_(c in voted) D foundation(c) = support(c)
found_support_proof: Prove found_support from
support {a _ z@p2},
extensionality[C] {a ,-- foundation(c), b _ support(c)}
found_sub_support: Sublemma (b, c) E G D foundation(b) C support(c)
found_sub_support_proof: Prove found_sub_support from
*1 C ,2 [C] {a _ foundation(b), b _ support(c)},
support_backup {a _ z@pl},
backup {b _ b@C, a *-- z@P1}
subset_support_proof: Prove subset_support from
found_sub_support {b _ a}, found_support {c _ a}
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committedAemma: Sublemma
committed_to(c)E critical_times(c)
A (V t:t E critical_times(c)D t> committed_to(c))
committed_proof:Prove committedAemma from
min_ax {a _ critical_times(c), x .-- t}
commit_when_proof: Prove commit_whenAemma from
in_own_support,
committedAemma {¢_ when(c)},
sched_whenAemma {a _ c}
commit_support_proof: Prove commit_supportAemma from
committedAemma {t *-- when(a)}, sched_whenJemma
commit_Gbar_lemma_proof: Prove commit_GbarAemma from
subset_support,
.1 c_.2 [c]
{a _- support(a),
b _- support(c),
z *-- sched(committed_to(a))},
committedlemma {t _ committed_to(a)},
committed_lemma {c *-- a}
End supports
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supports_tcc:Module
Using supports
Exporting allwithsupports
Theory
a: Var simple_machine.C
c: Var simple_rnachine.C
z: Var simple_machine.C
x: Var sirnple_machine.C
b:Var simple_machine.C
foundation_TCC 1: Formula
((b, c) E 9) A (_(c in voted V c in Cs)) ^ (-_(c = a))
D when(c) _>when(b)
Proof
foundation_TCC1_PROOF: Prove foundation_TCC1
End supports_tcc
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supports_tcc_proofs: Module
Proof
Using supports_tcc
foundation_TCCl_PROOF: Prove foundation_TCC1 from
Gbar_when {a _ b}
End supports_tcc_proofs
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correctness: Module
Using supports, sets[R], cardinality[R]
Exporting all with supports, sets[R]
Theory
i,j: Var R
a, c: Var C
m: Var M
OK: function[R --* set[C]] =
(,_i:
(_c:
( V m: committed_to(c) < m A m < when(c) D _F(i)(m))))
working: function[C --* set[R]] == ( _ c: ( ,k i: OK(i)(c)))
MOK: function[C --* bool] = ( _ c: 2, Iworking(c)l > Ifullset[R]l)
safe: Recursive function[C _ bool] =
( _ c: MOK(c)/x ( V a : (a, c) E G D safe(a))) by when
correct: function[C --* boo1] =
( _ c: ( V j: OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c) = runto(c)(c)))
the_result: Theorem safe(c) D correct(c)
End correctness
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correctness_tcc: Module
Using correctness
Exporting all withcorrectness
Theory
a: Var simple_machine.C
c: Var simple_machine.C
safe_TCCl: Formula ((a, c) E G) A (MOK(c)) D when(c) > when(a)
Proof
safe_TCCI_PROOF: Prove safe_TCC1
End correctness_tcc
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correctness_tcc_proofs:Module
Proof
Using correctness_tcc
safe_TCCI..PROOF: Prove safe_TCC1 from Gbar_when
End correctness_tcc_proofs
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connect: Module
Using correctness,natinduction,simple_props
Exporting all
Theory
a, c: Var C
j: Var R
a_correct_at_c: function[C, C _ bool] =
(Aa, c:
(Vj:
og(j)(c) D rrunto(previous(c))(j)(a)= runto(previous(c))(a)))
stay_correct: Lemma
( V a: (a, c) E _ D safe(c) A correct(a))
D (V a: (a, c) E G D a_correct_at_c(a, c))
Proof
i: Var R
m: Var M
r_indstep: Lemma
OK(j)(c)
^ (a, c) _ e
A when(a) < m
A m < when(c) A rrun(m)(j)(a) = rrunto(a)(j)(a)
D rrun(m + 1)(j)(a)= rrunto(a)(j)(a)
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r_indstep_proof: Prove r_indstep from
rrun {m _ m + 1},
vote_ax
{a *-- sstep(rrun(m), sehed(m + 1), m + 1),
c .-- sched(m + 1),
m_m+l,
i_j},
sstep_ax
{a *-- rrun(m),
c .-- sched(m + 1),
m*--re+l,
i ,--j},
step {s *-- rrun(m)(j), c _ sched(m + 1), m _- m + 1},
unique_when {p _ when(a), q _ m + 1},
sched_when_lemma,
OK {i _j, m _-m+ 1},
commit.support-lemma,
Gbar_support
q: Var M
stay_correct_reph Lemma
(a, c) E G h OK(j)(c) D rrunto(previous(c))(j)(a) = rrunto(a)(j)(a)
stay_correct_repl_proof: Prove stay_correct_repl from
limited_induction
{p .-- ( A q : rrun(q)(j)(a) = rrunto(a)(j)(a)),
m *-- when(a),
ml *-- when(c),
n *-- when(previous(c))},
rindstep {m .-- i@pl},
sched_when_lemma {a *-- previous(c)},
Gbar_when,
when_schedlemma {m .-- pred(when(c )) },
dowhen_pos
Gbar_OK: Lemma (a, c) e G A -.(a in voted) D (OK(/)(c) D OK(i)(a))
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Gbar_OK_proof: Prove Gbar_OK from
*1 C *2 [C] {a _ support(a), b _ support(c)},
OK {m _ re@P3},
OK {c *-- a},
Gbar_when,
commit_Gbar.lemma,
subset_support
not voted_transfer_correct: Lemma
(a, c) E G ^ safe(c) ^ -_(a in voted) ^ correct(a)
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(a)(j)(a)= runto(a)(a)
notvoted_proof: Prove notvoted_transfer_correct from
Cbar_OK {i _ j}, correct {c _- a}
torch_carried: Lemma
(a, c) E G ^ safe(c) D ( 3 j : og(j)(a) A og(j)(c))
torch_proof: Prove torch_carried {j _ x_p2} from
card_prop[R]
{a _ working(c),
b _ working(a),
c ,-- fuUset JR] },
empty_prop[R] {a _ working(c) O working(a) },
safe,
safe {c *-- a},
MOK,
MOK {c _ a},
.1 C_.2 JR] {a *-- working(c), b _- fullset[R]},
.1 c__.2 [R] {a _ working(a), b *-- fuUset[R]}
e: Vat rstate
vote_appln: Lemma
-_(F(i)(when(a))) ^ a in voted
D vote(a, a, when(a))(i)(a) = maj(a, a)
vote__ppln_proof: Prove vote_appln from
vote_ax {c _ a, m *-- when(a)}
safe_at_a: Lemma OK(i)(c)h (a,c) E -G D -_(F(i)(when(a)))
safe_at_a_proof: Prove safe_a,t_a from
OK {m *- when(a)}, Gbar_when, Gbar_support, commit_supportlemma
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OK_OK: Lemma
safe(c) A OK(i)(c) A OK(/)(c) A (a, c) e G A a in voted
D rrunto(a)(i)(a)= rrunto(a)(j)(a)
OK_OK_proof: Prove OK_OK from
rrun {m _ when(a) },
sched_whenJemma,
nat_invariant {nat_var ,-- when(a)},
vote_appln {a ,- sstep(rrun(pred(when(a))), a, when(a))},
safe_at_a,
vote_appln
{i _ j, a _ sstep(rrun(pred(when(a))), a, when(a))},
safe_at_a {i ,-- j}
voted_transfer_correct: Lemma
(a, c) E G A safe(c) A a in voted A correct(a)
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(a)(j)(a)= runto(a)(a)
voted_proof: Prove voted_transfer_correct from
OK_OK {i _ j_p2},
torch_carried,
correct {c _- a, j _ j@p2}
unvoted_transfer_correct: Lemma
(a, c) E G A sMe(c) A correct(a)
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(a)(j)(a) = runto(a)(a)
unvoted_proof: Prove unvoted_transfer_correct from
voted_transfer_correct, notvoted_transfer_correct
stay_correct_proof: Prove stay_correct from
stay_correct_simple,
stay_correct_repl {j _- j@p3},
a_correct_at_c_
when_scheddemma {rn _- pred(when(c))},
unvoted_transfer_correct {j ,- jQp3}
End connect
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sensor_step: Module
Using correctness, simple_props
Exporting withcorrectness, simple_props
Theory
a, c: Var C
sensor_inductive_step: Lemma
c in Cs h ( V a : (a, c) E "G D safe(c) h correct(a)) D correct(c)
Proof
j: Var R
sensor_steplemma: Lemma
when(c) > 0 A-,(c in voted)
D OK(j)(c)
D rrunto(c)(j)= step(rrun(pred(when(c)))(j),c, when(c))
sensor_step_proof: Prove sensor_step_]emma from
rrun {m ,-- when(c)},
vote_ax
{i ,-- j,
m _ when(c),
a _- sstep(rrun(pred(when(c))), c, when(c))},
sstep_ax
{i_j,
a _- rrun(pred(when(c))),
m #-- when(c)},
sched_when_lemma {a *-- c},
OK {i _ j, m _ when(c)},
commit_when_lemma
sensor_rruntoAemma: Lemma
when(c) > 0 h c in Cs
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c)= sensor(c)(when(c))
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sensor_rrunto_proof: Prove sensor_rruntoAemma from
sensor_stepAemma,
step
{s *-- rrun(pred(when(c)))(j),
m *-- when(c),
C<-- C}_
voted_ax
main_sensorAemma: Lemma
when(c) > 0 A c in CS D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c) = runto(c)(c)
main_sensor_proof: Prove main_sensorAemma from
simple_sensor_step Aemma, sensor_rrunto_lemma
sensor_ind_step_proof: Prove sensor_inductive_step from
dowhen_pos, main_sensorAemma {j ,-- j@p3}, correct, sensor_ax
End sensor_step
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sensor_step_tcc: Module
Using sensor_step
Exporting all withsensor_step
Theory
c: Var simple_machine.C
j: Var repl_machine.R
sensor_rrunto/emma_TC C 1: Formula
(OK(j)(c)) h (when(c) > 0 A c in Cs)
D (cell_type(c) = sensor_cell)
Proof
sensor_rrunto_lemma_TCCl_PROOF: Prove sensor_rrunto_lemma_TCC1
End sensor_step_tcc
94
nonvoted_step: Module
Using correctness, connect
Exporting withcorrectness, connect
Theory
a, c: Var C
j: Var R
nonvoted_inductive_step: Lernma
-_(c in Cs)
^ "_(c in voted) ^ ( V a : (a, c) E G 3 safe(c) ^ correct(a))
D correct(c)
nonvoted_task,OK: Lemma
-_(c in Cs) ^ ( V a : (a, c) E "_ D a_correct_t_c(a, c))
D OK(j)(c)
task(c)(rrunto(previous(c))(j)) = task(c)(runto(previous(c)))
a_l_correct_atoc: function[C --* bool] =
( A c : ( V a: (a, c) E _ D a_correct_at_c(a, c)))
Proof
nonvoted_task_OK_proof: Prove nonvoted_task_OK {a _ a@p2) from
a_correct_at_c {a _ a_p2},
dependency
{s ,-- rrun(pred(when(c)))(j),
t ,-- run(pred(when(c)))},
dowhen_previous
nonvoted_xrunto_task: Lemma
-_(c in Cs)
A -_(c in voted) ^ ( V a : (a, c) E G D a_correct._t_c(a, c))
D OK(j)(c)D rrunto(c)(j)(c)= task(c)(rrun(pred(when(c)))(j))
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nonvoted_rrunto_taskoproof: Prove nonvoted_rrunto_task from
rrun {m _- when(c)},
vote_ax
{a *-- sstep(rrun(pred(when(c))), c, when(c)),
m *-- when(c),
i
sstep_a_x
a *-- rrun(pred(when(c))),
m ,- when(c)},
step {m _- when(c), s _- rrun(pred(when(c)))(j)},
sched°when_lemma {a *-- c),
OK {i ,-- j, m +-- when(c)},
commit_when_lemma,
dowhen_pos
link: Lemma
-_(cin Cs) A -_(cin voted)A (V a :(a,c)E G D a_correct_at_c(a,c))
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c)= runto(c)(c)
link_proof: Prove link {a *-- a_p6} from
nonvoted_rrunto_t ask,
simple_steplemma,
nonvoted_task_OK,
dowhen_previous,
all_correct_at_c {a +-- a@p3},
all_correct_at_c {a ,-- a_pl}
main_non_voted_lemma: Lemma
-_(c in Cs)
^ -_(c in voted) ^ (V a : (a, c) e _ D safe(c) A correct(a))
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c)= runto(c)(c)
main_nonvoted_proof: Prove main_non_voted-lemma {a +- a_p2} from
link, stay_correct {a *-- a@pl}
nonvoted_ind_proof: Prove nonvoted.inductive.step {a _ a_pl} from
main_non_votedJemma {j *-- j@p2}, correct
End nonvoted_step
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nonvoted_step_tcc: Module
Using nonvoted_step
Exporting all withnonvoted_step
Theory
c: Var simple_machine.C
j: Var repl_machine.R
a: Var simple_machine.C
nonvoted_task_OK_TC C 1: Formula
(OK(j)(c))
A (-_(c in Cs) A ( V a: (a, c) E G D a_correct_at_c(a, c)))
D (cell-type(c) _ sensor_cell)
nonvoted_rrunto_task_TC C 1: Formula
(OK(j)(c))
^ i,-,Cs)
A-_(c in voted)
A ( V a: (a, c) E G D a_correct_at_c(a, c)))
D (cell_type(c) # sensor_cell)
Proof
nonvoted_task_OK_TCCl_PROOF: Prove nonvoted_task_OK_TCC1
nonvoted_rrunto_task_TCC1_PROOF: Prove nonvoted_rrunto_task_TCC1
End nonvoted_.step_tcc
voted_step
voted_step: Module
Using correctness, connect, nonvoted_step
Exporting induction_body withcorrectness, connect
Theory
a, e: Var C
voted_inductive_step: Lemma
c in voted A (V a: (a, c) e G D safe(c) A correct(a))
D correct(c)
induction_body: function[C --, bool] =
( A c: ( V a: (a, c) e G D safe(c) h correct(a)))
Proof
i,j: Var R
a: Var rstate
m: Var M
voted_steplemma: Lemma
c in voted
D OX(j)(c)
sstep(rrun(pred(when(c))), c, when(c))(j)(c)
= task(c)(rrun(pred(when(c)))(j))
voted_step_proof: Prove voted_stepdemma from
sstep_ax
{i _j,
a _ rrun(pred(when(c))),
m _ when(c)),
step {m _ when(c), s _-- rrun(pred(when(c)))(j)},
OK {i _- j, m _- when(c)},
commit_when lemma,
voted_ax
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sstep_task/emma: Lemma
c in voted^ (V_: (-,c) e _ _ __co_,ect__t_¢(_,c))
D OK(j)(c)
D sstep(rrun(pred(when(c))), c, when(c))(j)(c)
= task(c)(run(pred(when(c))))
sstep_task_proof: Prove sstep_task.lemma {a *-- a@p2} from
voted_step.lemma, nonvoted_task_OK, dowhen_previous, voted_ax
x: Var D
majlemma: Lemma
MOK(c)A (Vi: OK(i)(c) D a(i)(c) = z) D maj(a,c) = x
maj_proof: Prove majlemma {i _ i@pl} from
maj_ax {A *-- working(c)}, MOK
vote_lemma: Lemma
OK(j)(c)
A MOK(c)
^ c in voted
A committed_to(e) g m
h m < when(c)
A (V i: OK(i)(c) D sstep(a,c,m)(i)(c)= x)
D rstep(a, c, m)(j)(c) = x
voteAemma_proof: Prove vote_lemma {i ,--- i@p2} from
vote_a,x {i (-- j, a (-- sstep(a, c, m)},
majlemma {a _ sstep(a, c, m)},
OK {i _ j}
rstep_task: Lemma
MOK(c)
A c in voted
h OK(j)(c) A ( V a : (a, c) 6 G D a_correct_at_c(a, c))
D rstep( rrun( pred( when(c ))), c, when( c ))(j )( c )
= task( c)( run(pred( when( c ))))
active_task: function[C --, CT] ==
( A c --. CT : if c in Cs then arb_task else c end if)
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rstep_task_proof: Prove rstep_task {a +- a@pl} from
sstep_task_lemma {j _-- i_p2},
vote_lemma
{ z _ task(active_task(c)) (run(pred(when(c)))),
a _ rrun(pred(when(c))),
m _- when(c)),
commit_when_lemma,
voted_ax
rrunto_task: Lemma
MOK(c)
A c in voted
A OK(j)(c)A (V a: (a, c) E G D a_correct_at_c(a, c))
D rrunto( c )(j )( c ) = task(c )(run(pred(when( c )) ) )
rrunto_task_proof: Prove rrunto_task {a ,--- a@pl} from
rstep_task,
rrun {m _ when(c)),
dowhen_pos,
sched_whenJemma {a _ c)
voted linklemma: Lemma
c in voted A MOK(c) A ( V a: (a, c) e G D a_correct_at_c(a, c))
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c) = runto(c)(c)
voted_link_proof: Prove voted_link__lemma {a _ a@pl) from
rrunto_task, simple_step_lemma, voted_ax
main_voted hemma: Lemma
c in voted A induction_body(c)
D OK(j)(c) D rrunto(c)(j)(c) = runto(c)(c)
sensors_not_voted: Lemma c in voted D -_(c in Cs)
sensors_not_voted_proof: Prove sensors_not_voted from voted_ax
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main_vote_proof: Prove main_voteddemma from
voted_tinkdemma,
safe,
stay_correct (a _ a_pl),
sensor_ax,
sensors_not_voted,
induction_body {a _ a_}p3},
induction_body (a *- a_p4}
voted_ind_step_proof: Prove voted_inductive_step {a _ aC}p3) from
main_voted_lemma {j *- j_p2}, correct, induction_body
End voted_step
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc: Module
Using voted_step
Exporting all withvoted_step
Theory
c: Var simple_machine.C
j: Var repl_machine.R
i: Var repl machine.R
a: Var simple_.machine.C
voted_step_lemma_TCC 1: Formula
(OK(j)(c)) A (c in voted) D (cell_type(c) _ sensor_cell)
sstep_task_lemma_TCC1: Formula
(OK(j)(c))
A (c in voted A ( V a : (a, c) E G D a_correct_at_c(a, c)))
D (cell_type(c) _ sensor_cell)
rstep_task_TCCl: Formula
(MOK(c) A c in voted
A OK(j)(c)A (V a: (a, c) e G D a_correct_at_c(a, c)))
D (cell_type(c) _ sensor_cell)
active_task_TCC 1: Formula
(cell_type( if c in Cs then arb_task else c end if) _ sensor_cell)
Proof
voted_steplemma_TCCl_PROOFi Prove voted_step_lemma_TCC1
sstep_task_lemma_TCCl__PROOF: Prove sstep_taskAemma_TCC1
rstep_task_TCC 1_PROOF: Prove rstep_task_TCC 1
active_task_TCC l_PROOF: Prove active_task_TCC 1
End voted_tep_tcc
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voted.step_t cc_proofs: Module
Proof
Using voted.step_tcc
voted.stepJemma_TCCl_PROOF: Prove voted_stepJemma_TCC1 from
voted_ax
sstep_taskJemma_TCCl_PROOF: Prove sstepotaskJemma_TCC1 from
voted._x
rstep_task_TCCl_PROOF: Prove rstep_task_TCC1 from voted_ax
End voted.step_tcc_proofs
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correctness_proof: Module
Using correctness, voted_step, nonvoted_step, sensor_step,
noetherian[C, (*1,_2) 6 _]
Exporting withcorrectness
Proof
a, c: Var C
discharge_well_founded: Prove well_founded {mea.sure *-- when} from
Gbar_when {c _ b}
inductive_step: Lemma
( V a : (a, c) E G D safe(c) ^ correct(a)) D correct(c)
almost_final_proof: Prove inductive_step {a _ a@p7} from
sensor _in ductive_step,
voted_inductive_step,
nonvoted_inductive-step,
induction_body (a _ a_pl},
induction_body {a _ a_p2},
induction_body {a _ a_p3},
induction_body
final_proof: Prove the_result from
mod_induction
{A *-- safe,
B ,- correct,
d _-- c,
d2 _ a@p3},
safe {a _ d4@pl, c _ d3@pl},
inductive_step {c _ dl_pl)
End correctness_proof
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outputs: Module
Using correctness
Exporting all withcorrectness
Theory
c: Var C
j: Var R
actuators_correct: Corollary
c in voted h safe(c) h -_F(j)(when(c))
D rrunto(c)(j)(c)= runto(c)(c)
Proof
a: Var C
a: Var rstate
i: Var R
m: Var M
vote_gives_maj: Lemma
_F(i)(m) A a in voted D vote(a, a, m)(i)(a) = maj(a, a)
vote_gives_maj_proof: Prove vote_gives_maj from vote_ax {c +-- a}
rrun_gets_maj: Lemma
-_F(i)(when(a)) A a in voted
D rrunto(a)(i)(a) = maj(sstep(rrun(pred(when(a))), a, when(a)), a)
rrun_gets_Inaj_proof: Prove rrun_getsAnaj from
rrun {m +-- when(a) ),
vote_gives_maj
{a +-- sstep(rrun(pred(when(a))), a, when(a)),
m +-- when(a)),
dowhen_pos {c +-- a},
sched_whenJemma
working_agreement: Lamina
-_F(i)(when(a)) A -_F(j)(when(a)) A a in voted
D rrunto(a)(i)(a)= rrunto(a)(j)(a)
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working_agreement_proof: Prove working_agreement from
rrun_gets_maj, rrun_gets.maj {i *-- j}
safe_OK: Lemma safe(c) D ( 3j : OK(j)(c))
safe_OK_proof: Prove safe_OK {j ,-- x@p4} from
safe,
MOK,
nat_invariant {n_t_var _ [fuUset[R][},
empty_prop[R] {a _ working(c)}
actuators_correct_proof: Prove actuators_correct from
the_result {c _ c@c},
correct {j _ i@p3, c _ c@c},
working_agreement {a *-- c@c, i ,--- j@p4},
safe_OK,
OK {m _ when(c), i *-- i@p3},
commit_whenAemma
End outputs
Appendix B
Cross-Reference Listing
This Appendix provides a cross-reference listing to the identifiers declared in the
F_IiDM specification. It should assist in reading and navigating the EHDM specifica-
tions in Appendix A.
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Identifier
a_correct_at_c
active_task
active_tasks
active_tasks_TCCl
active_tasks_TCCl_PR00F
active_tasks_TCC1_PR00F
active_task_TCC1
active_task_TCC1_PR00F
actuators
actuators_correct
actuators_correct_proof
actuators_TCCl
actuators_TCCl_PR00F
actuators_TCCl_PR00F
add
all_correct_at_c
almost_final_proof
antisymmetry
arb_actuator
arb_task
backup
C
card
card_ax
card_empty
cardinality
card_proof
card_prop
card_subset
cell_type
cell_types
commit_Gbar_lemma
commit_Gbar_lemma_proof
commit_support_lemma
commit_support_proof
committed_lemma
Declaration
defined-fn
literal-fn
subtype-with
formula
prove
prove
formula
prove
subtype-with
formula
prove
formula
prove
prove
literal-fn
defined-fn
prove
formula
const
const
defined-fn
type
function
axiom
axiom
module
prove
formula
axiom
function
type
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
Module
connect
voted_step
simple_machine
simple_machine_Zcc
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc_proofs
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc
simple_machine
outputs
outputs
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc_proofs
sets
nonvoted_step
correctness_proof
orderedsets
simple_machine
simple_machine
supports
simple_machine
cardinality
cardinality
cardinality
cardinaliZy
cardinality
cardinality
cardinality
simple_machine
simple_machine
supports
supports
supports
supports
supports
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Identifier Declaration Module
committed_proof
committed_to
commit_when_lemma
commit_when_proof
connect
correct
correctness
correctness_proof
correctness_tcc
correctness_tcc_proofs
critical_times
D
dependency
dependency_TCC1
dependency_TCCl_PROOF
dichotomy
difference
discharge
discharge_antisymmetry
discharge_dichotomy
discharge_reflexive
discharge_transitive
discharge_well_founded
disharge_finite
dowhen
dowhen_pos
dowhen_previous
dowhen_prev_proof
empty
empty_prop
empty_prop_proof
emptyset
extensionality
F
final_proof
finite
prove
_ter_-fn
formula
prove
module
defined-fn
module
module
module
modu_
_teral-fn
type
axiom
formula
prove
formula
fiter_-fn
prove
prove
prove
prove
prove
prove
prove
function
axiom
formula
prove
defined-fn
formula
prove
fiteral-const
axiom
function
prove
formula
supports
supports
supports
supports
connect
correctness
correctness
correctness_proof
correctness_tcc
correctness_tcc_proofs
supports
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
orderedsets
sets
natinduction
supports
supports
supports
supports
correctness_proof
repl_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
s imple_machine
s impl e_mach ine
sets
cardinality
cardinality
sets
sets
repl_machine
correctness_proof
cardinality
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Identifier Declaration Module
foundation
foundation_TCCl
foundation_TCCl_PKDDF
foundation_TCCl_PRDOF
found_sub_support
found_sub_support_proof
found_support
found_support_proof
fullset
Gbar
Gbar_OK
Gbar_OK_proof
Gbar_support
Gbar_support_prf
Gbar_when
general_induction
identity
identity
ind_m_proof
ind_m_proof_TCCl
ind_m_proof_TCCl_PKOOF
ind_proof
indstep
indstep_proof
induction
induction_body
induction_m
inductive_step
in_own_support
in_own_support_proof
instance
intersection
limited_induction
limited_proof
link
link_proof
recursive-fn
formula
prove
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
literal-const
function
formula
prove
formula
prove
axiom
axiom
hteral-fn
hteral-fn
prove
formula
prove
prove
formula
prove
formula
defined-fn
formula
formula
formula
prove
module
literal-fn
formula
prove
formula
prove
supports
supports_tcc
supports_tcc
supports_tcc_proofs
supports
supports
supports
supports
sets
simple_machine
connect
connect
supports
supports
simple_machine
noetherian
natinduction
simple_machine
natinduction
natinduction_tcc
natinduction_tcc
natinduction
simple_props
simple_props
natinduction
voted_step
natinduction
correcZnessproof
supports
supports
natinduction
sets
natinduction
natinduction
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
Table B.I: EI-IDM Identifers used in the Specification (continues)
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Identifier Declaration Module
M
main_non.voted_lemma
main_nonvoted_proof
main_sensor_lemma
main_sensor_proof
main_voted_lemma
main_vote_proof
maj
maj _ax
maj _lemma
maj _proof
memb er
rain
min_ax
mod_induction
mod_proof
MOK
natinduction
natinduc_ion_tcc
noetherian
nonvoted_ind_proof
nonvoted_inductive_step
nonvoted_rrunto_task
nonvoted_rrunto_task.proof
nonvoted_rrunto_task_TCC1
nonvoted_rrunto_task.TCCl_PROOF
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step_tcc
nonvoted.task_OK
nonvoted_task_OK_proof
nonvoZed_task_OK_TCCl
nonvoted_task_OK_TCC1_PROOF
notvoted_proof
notvoted_transfer_correct
OK
OK_OK
type
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
function
axiom
formula
prove
literal-fn
function
axiom
formula
prove
defined-fn
module
module
module
prove
formula
formula
prove
formula
prove
module
module
formula
prove
formula
prove
prove
formula
defined-fn
formula
simple_machine
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
sensor_step
sensor_step
voted_step
voted_step
rep1_machine
rep1_machine
voted_step
voted_step
sets
orderedsets
orderedsets
noetherian
noetherian
correctness
natinduction
natinduction_tcc
noetherian
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
nonvoZed_step_tcc
nonvoted_sZep_tcc
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step_tcc
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step
nonvoted_step_tcc
nonvoted_step_tcc
connect
connect
correctness
connect
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Identifier Declaration Module
OK_OK_proof
orderedsets
outputs
prey
previous
r
R
reflexive
repl_machine
repl_machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc_proofs
r_indstep
r_indstep_proof
rrun
rrun_gets_maj
rrun_gets_maj_proof
rrun_TCC1
rrun_TCCI_PROOF
rrun_TCC2
rrun_TCC2_PROOF
rrunto
rrunto_task
rrunto_task_proof
rstate
rstep
rstep_task
rstep_task_proof
rstep_task_TCCl
rstep_task_TCCl_PROOF
rstep_task_TCCl_PROOF
R_TCC1
R_TCCI_PROOF
R_TCCI_PROOF
run
run_TCCl
run_TCCI_PROOF
prove
module
module
literal-fn
literal-fn
const
subtype-with
formula
module
module
module
formula
prove
recursive-fn
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
literal-fn
formula
prove
type
literal-fn
formula
prove
formula
prove
prove
formula
prove
prove
recursive-fn
formula
prove
connect
orderedsets
outputs
natinduction
simple_machine
repl_machine
rep1_machine
orderedsets
rep1_machine
repl.machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc_proofs
connect
connect
repl_machine
outputs
outputs
repl_machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc
repl_machine
voted_step
voted_step
repl_machine
repl_machine
voted_step
voted_step
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc_proofs
rep1_machine_tcc
repl_machine_tcc
rep1_machine_tcc_proofs
simple_machine
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_ice
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Identifier Declaration Module
formularun_TCC2
run_TCC2_PROOF
runto
safe
safe_aZ_a
s af e_ at_ a_proof
safe_OK
safe_0K_proof
safe_TCC1
saf e_TCCI_PR00F
safe_TCO%_PR00F
sched
sched_when_ax
sched_when_lemma
sched_when_proof
sensor
sensor_ax
sensor_fn
sen sor _ ind_ st ep_proof
sensor_inductive_step
sensor_rrunto_lemma
sens or_ rrunt o_ I emma_ TCC i
sensor_rrunZo_ lemma_TCCl _PROOF
sensor_rrunto_proof
sensors
sensors_not_rot ed
sensors_not_voted_proof
sensors_TCC1
sensors_TCCI_PR00F
sensors_TCCl_PROOF
sensor_step
sensor_sZep_lemma
sensor_step_proof
sensor_step_tcc
set
sets
prove
literal-fn
recursive-fn
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
prove
function
axiom
formula
prove
function
axiom
type
prove
formula
formula
formula
prove
prove
subtype-with
formula
prove
formula
prove
prove
module
formula
prove
module
type
module
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine
correctness
connect
connect
outputs
outputs
correcZness_Zcc
correctness_tcc
correctness_tcc_proofs
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
simple_machine
sensor_step
sensor_step
sensor_step
sensor_step_tcc
sensor_step_tcc
sensor_step
simple_machine
voted_step
voted_step
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc_proofs
sensor_step
sensor_step
sensor_step
sensor_step_tcc
sets
sets
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Identifier Declaration Module
simple_machine
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc_proofs
simple_props
simple_props_tcc
simple_sensor_step_lemma
simple_sensor_step_lemma_TCCl
simple_sensor_step_lemma_TCCl_PROOF
simple_sensor_step_proof
simple_step_lemma
simple_st ep_lemma_proof
simp le_st ep_l emma_ TCC l
simple_ st ep_lemma_TCC 1_PROOF
singleton
sstep
sstep_ax
sstep_task_lemma
sstep_task_lemma_TCCl
sstep_task_lemma_TCCl_PROOF
sstep_task_lemma_TCCl_PRODF
sstep_task_proof
start_cell
state
stay_correct
stay_correct_proof
stay_correct_repl
stay_correct_repl_proof
stay_correct_simple
stay_simple_proof
step
step_TCCl
step_TCCI_PROOF
step_TCC2
step_TCC2_PROOF
subset
subset_support
module
module
module
module
module
formula
formula
prove
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
literaJ-fn
function
axiom
formula
formula
prove
prove
prove
const
type
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
prove
defined-fn
formula
prove
formula
prove
defined-fn
formula
simple_machine
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc_proofs
simple_props
simple_props_tcc
simple_props
simple_props_tcc
simple_props_ice
simple_props
simple_props
simple_props
simple_props_tcc
simple_props_tcc
sets
repl_machine
repl_machine
voted_step
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc_proofs
voted_step
simple_machine
simple_machine
connect
connect
connect
connect
simple_props
simple_props
simple_machine
simple_machine_ice
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
simple_machine_tcc
sets
supports
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Identifier Declaration Module
subset_support _proof
subset_union
subset_union_proof
support
support_backup
support _backup _proof
supports
supports_Zcc
supports_tcc_proofs
task
task_fn
the_result
torch_carried
torch_proof
transitive
twice_proof
twice_prop
under
union
unique _when
unique_when_proof
unvoted_proof
unvot ed_transf er_correct
vote
vote_appln
vote_appln_proof
voZe_ax
voted
voted_ax
voted_ind_szep_proof
voted_induct ire_st ep
voted_link_lemma
voted_link_proof
voted_proof
voted_step
voted_step_lemma
prove
formula
prove
defined-fn
formula
prove
module
module
module
function
type
formula
formula
prove
formula
prove
formula
const
literal-fn
formula
prove
prove
formula
function
formula
prove
axiom
subtype
axiom
prove
formula
formula
prove
prove
module
formula
supports
cardinal ity
cardinality
supports
supports
supports
supports
supporZs_tcc
supporZs_tcc_proofs
simple_machine
simp ie_mach ine
correctness
connect
connect
orderedsets
cardinality
cardinality
simple_machine
sets
simple_machine
simple_machine
connect
connect
repl_machine
connect
connect
repl_machine
repl_machine
rep1_machine
voted_step
voted_step
voted_step
voted_step
connect
voted_step
voted_step
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Identifier Declaration Module
voted_step_lemma_TCCl
voted_step_lemma_TCCl_PROOF
voted_step_lemma_TCCl_PROOF
voted_step_proof
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc_proofs
voted_transfer_correct
vote_gives_maj
vote_gives_maj_proof
formula
prove
prove
prove
module
module
formula
formula
prove
vote_lemma
vote_lemma_proof
well_founded
when_sched_lemma
when_sched_proof
.orking
working_aEreement
.orking_agreement_proof
formula
prove
formula
formula
prove
literal-in
formula
prove
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc_proofs
voted_step
voted_step_tcc
voted_step_tcc_proofs
connect
outputs
outputs
voted_step
voted_step
noetherian
simple_machine
simple_machine
correctness
outputs
outputs
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Appendix C
Results of Proof-Chain
Analysis
The following pages reproduce the output from the EttDM proof-chain analyzer in
"terse mode" applied to the formula actuators_correct in module outputs. The
EItDM proof-chain analyzer examines the macroscopic structure of a verification--
checking that all the premises used in a proof are either axioms, definitions, or
formulas which are, themselves, the target of a successful proof elsewhere in the
verification. If any formulas are used from a module having an assuming clause, then
the proof-chain analyzer checks that those assumptions are discharged by successful
proofs; similarly, if formulas are used from a module having a tcc module, then
the proof-chain analyzer checks that all the tccs in that module are discharged by
successful proofs. The proof-chain analyzer ignores unsuccessful proofs (such as
automatically-generated tcc proofs) when a successful proof for the same formula
can be found. The "terse mode" output reproduced here provides a commentary
on only the "interesting" cases, namely proof obligations involving assuming clauses
and tccs, and a summary. All the proofs listed in the summary were performed by
the EIt DM theorem prover in "checking mode."
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Proof chain for formula actuators_correct in module outputs
Use of the formula
correctness.the_result
requires the following TCCs to be proven
correctness_tcc.safe_TCC1
Formula correctness_tcc.safe_TCCl is a termination TCC for correctness.safe
Proof of
correctness_tcc.safe_TCC1
must not use
correctness.safe
Use of the formula
simple_machine.Gbar_when
requires the following TCCs to be proven
simple_machine_tcc.sensors_TCC1
slmple_machine_tcc
slmple_machine_tcc
slmple_machine_tcc
slmplemachine_tcc
slmple_machine_tcc
slmple_machinetcc
slmple_machine_tcc
.actuators_TCCl
active_tasks_TCC1
dependency_TCC1
step TCC1
step_TCC2
_m_TCCl
run_TCC2
Formula simple_machine_tcc.run_TCC2 is a termination TCC for simple_machine.run
Proof of
simple_machine_tcc.run_TCC2
must not use
simple_machine.run
Use of the formula
noetherian[simple_machine.C, simple_machine.Gbar].mod_induction
requires the following assumptions to be discharged
noetherian[simplemachine. C, simple machine.Gbar].well_founded
Use of the formula
sensor_step.sensor_inductive_step
requires the following TCCs to be proven
sensor_step_tcc.sensor_rrunto_lemma_TCC1
Use of the formula
simple_props.simple_sensor_step_lemma
requires the following TCCs to be proven
simple_props_tcc.simple_sensor_step_lemma_TCCl
simple_propstcc.simple_step_lemma_TCC1
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Use of the formula
repl_machine.rrun
requires the following TCCs to be proven
repl_machine_tcc.R_TCC1
repl_machine_¢cc.rrun_TCCl
rep1_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC2
Formula repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC2 is a termination TCC for repl_machine.rrun
Proof of
repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC2
must not use
repl_machine.rrun
Use of the formula
supports.commit_when_lemma
requires the following TCCs to be proven
supports__cc.foundation_TCCl
Formula supports_tcc.foundation_TCCl is a termination TCC for
supports.foundation
Proof of
supports_tcc.foundation_TCC1
must not use
supports.foundation
Use of the formula
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].min_ax
requires the following assumptions to be discharged
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].reflexive
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].transitive
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].antisymmetry
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].dichotomy
Use of the formula
voted_step.voted_inductive_step
requires the following TCCs to be proven
voted_step_tcc.voted_step_lemma_TCC1
voted_step_tcc.sstep_task_lemma_TCC1
voted_step_tcc.rstep_task_TCCl
voted_step_tcc.active_task_TCC1
Use of the formula
nonvoted_step.nonvoted_task_OX
requires the followin E TCCs to be proven
nonvoted_step_tcc.nonvoSed_task_OK_TCC1
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nonvoted_step_tcc.nonvoted_rrunto_task_TCC1
Use of the formula
natinduction.induction_m
requires the following TCCs to be proven
natinduction_tcc.ind_m_proof_TCCl
Use of the formula
noetherian[naturalnumber, natinduction.prev].general_induction
requires the following assumptions to be discharged
noetherian[naturalnumber, natinduc_ion.prev].well_founded
Use of the formula
cardinality[repl_machine.R].card_prop
requires the following assumptions to be discharged
cardinality[repl_machine.R].finite
SUMMARY
The proof chain is complete
The axioms and assumptions at the base are:
cardinality [EXPR3. card_ax
cardinality [EXPR]. card_empty
cardinality [EXPR]. card_subset
naturalnumbers.nat_invariant
noetherian[EXPR, EXPR].general_induc$ion
orderedsets[EXPR, EXPR].min_ax
repl_machine.R_invariant
repl_machine.maj_ax
repl_machine.sstep_ax
repl_machine.vote_ax
repl_machine.voted_ax
sets[EXPR].extensionality
simple_machine.Gbar_when
simple_machine.dependency
simple_machine.distinct cell_types
simple_machine.dowhen_pos
simple_machine.sched_when_ax
simple_machine.sensor_ax
Total: IB
The definitions are:
connect.a_correct at c
correctness.MOK
correctness.DE
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correctness, correct
correctness, safe
nonvot ed_step, all_correct_at_c
repl_machine, rrun
set s [EXPR]. empty
sets [EXPR] .subset
s imple_machine, run
s imple_machine, st ep
support s. backup
supports, foundation
support s. support
rot ed_st ep. induct ion_body
Total : 15
The formulae used are:
cardinality [EXPR]. card_prop
cardinality [EXPR]. empty_prop
cardinality [EXPR]. subset_union
cardinality [EXPR]. twice_prop
cardinality [repl_machine. ]%J•finite
connect. Gbar_OK
connect. OK_OK
connect, notvot ed_transf er_correct
connect, r_indstep
connect, saf e_at_a
connect, stay_correct
connect, stay_correct_repl
connect, torch_carried
connect, unvot ed_transf er_correct
connect, vote_appln
connect, voted_transfer_correct
correctness, the_result
correctness_proof, inductive_step
correctness_tcc, safe_TCC1
nat induct ion. induct ion
nat induct ion. induct ion_m
nat induct ion. Iimit ed_ induct ion
natinduction_t cc. ind_m_proof_TCC1
noetherian [EXPR, EXPR]. mod_induction
noether Jan [nat uralnumber, nat induct ion. prey]. ,ell_founded
noetherian [simple_machine. C, simple_machine. Gbar]. well_founded
nonvot ed_step, link
nonvot ed_st ep. main_non_rot ed_lemma
nonvoted_step, nonvoted_induct ive_st ep
nonvoted_step, nonvoted_rrunto_task
nonvoted_step, nonvoted_task_OK
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nonvoted_step_tcc.nonvoted_r_nto__ask_TCC1
nonvoted_sCep_tcc.nonvoted_task_OK_TCC1
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].antisymmetry
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].dichotomy
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].reflexive
orderedsets[naturalnumber, <=].transi¢ive
outputs.actuators_correct
outputs.rrun_gets_maj
outputs.safe_OK
outputs.vote_gives_ma j
outputs.workinE_agreement
repl_machine_tcc.R_TCC1
repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC1
repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC2
sensor_step.main_sensor_lemma
sensor_step.sensor_inductive_step
sensor_step.sensor_rrunto_lemma
sensor_step.sensor_step_lemma
sensor_step_tcc.sensor_rrun_o_lemma_TCC1
sxmplemachine.dowhen_previous
sxmple_machine.sched_,hen_lemma
slmple_machine.unique_when
slmple_machine.when_sched_lemma
slmple_machine_tcc.active_tasks_TCC1
slmple_machine_tcc.actuators_TCCl
slmple_machine_tcc.dependency_TCCl
sxmple_machine_tcc.run_TCC1
slmple_machine_tcc.run_TCC2
slmple_machine_tcc.sensors_TCC1
slmple_machine_tcc.step_TCC1
slmple_machine_tcc.step_TCC2
sxmple_props.indstep
sxmple_props.simple_sensor_step_le_a
slmple_props.simple_step_lemma
slmple_props.stay_correct_simple
s_mple_props_tcc.simple_sensor_s_ep_lemma_TCCl
slmple_props_tcc.simple_step_lemma_TCC1
supports.Gbar_support
supports.commit_Gbarlemma
supports.commit_support_lemma
supports.commitwhen_lemma
supports.committed_lemma
supports.found_sub_support
supports.found_support
supports.in_o,n_suppor_
supports.subsetsupport
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supports.support_backup
supports_tcc.foundation_TCCl
voted_step.main_voted_lemma
voted_step.maj_lemma
voted_step.rrunto_task
voted_step.rstep_task
voted_step.sensorsnot_voted
voted_step.sstep_task_lemma
voted_step.vote_lemma
voted_step.voted_inductive_step
voted_step.voted_link_lemma
voted_step.voted_step_lemma
voted_step_tcc.active_task_TCCl
voted_step_tcc.rstep_task_TCCl
voted step_tcc.sstep_task_lemma_TCCl
voted step_tcc.voted_step_lemma_TCC1
Total: 93
The completed proofs are:
cardinality[EXPR].card_proof
cardinality[EXPR].empty_prop_proof
cardinality[EXPR].subsetunion_proof
cardinality[EXPR].twice_proof
connect Gbar_OK_proof
connec_ OK_OK_proof
connect notvotedproof
connect r indstep_proof
connect safe_at_a_proof
connect stay correct_proof
connect stay_correct_repl_proof
connect torch_proof
connect unvoted_proof
connect vote_appln_proof
connect voted_proof
correctness_proof.almost_final_proof
correctness_proof.discharge_well_founded
correctness_proof.final_proof
correctness_tcc_proofs.safe_TCCl_PROOF
natinduction.d±scharge
natinducrion.ind_m_proof
natinduction.ind_proof
natinduction.limited_proof
natinduction_tcc.ind_m_proof_TCC1_PROOF
noetherian[EXPR, EXPR].modproof
nonvoted_step.link_proof
nonvoted_step.main_nonvoted_proof
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nonvoted_step.nonvoted_ind_proof
nonvoted_step.nonvoted_rrunto_task_proof
nonvoted_step.nonvoted_task_OK_proof
nonvoted_step_tcc.nonvoted_rrunto_task_TCCl_PROOF
nonvoted_steptcc.nonvoted_$ask_OK_TCCl_PROOF
outputs.actuators_correct_proof
outputs.rrun_gets_maj_proof
outputs.safe_OK_proof
outputs.vote_gives_maj_proof
outputs.working_agreement_proof
repl_machine.disharge_finite
repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCCl_PRODF
repl_machine_tcc.rrun_TCC2_PROOF
repl_machine_tcc_proofs.R_TCCl_PROOF
sensor_step.main_sensor_proof
sensor_step.sensor_ind_step_proof
sensor_step.sensor_rrunto_proof
sensor_step.sensor_step_proof
sensor_step_tcc.sensor_rrunto_lemma_TCCi_PROOF
slmple_machine.dowhen_prev_proof
slmple_machine.sched_when_proof
slmple_machine.unique_when_proof
slmple_machine.when_sched_proof
slmple_machine_tcc.dependencyTCCl_PROOF
slmple_machine_tcc.run_TCCl_PROOF
slmple_machine_tcc.run_TCC2_PROOF
slmple_machine_tcc.step_TCCl_PROOF
slmple_machine_tcc.step_TCC2_PROOF
slmple_machine_tcc_proofs.active_tasks_TCCl_PROOF
slmple_mach±ne_tcc_proofs.actuators_TCCl_PROOF
slmplemachine_tcc_proo_s.sensors_TCC1_PROOF
slmple_props.indstep_proof
slmple_props.simple_sensor_step_proof
slmple_props, simpl e_st ep_l emma_pr o of
simple_props, stay_simple_proof
simpl e_props_t cc. simpl e_s ens or_ st ep_l emma_TCC 1_PROOF
slmple_props_tcc.simple_step_lemma_TCCl_PROOF
supports. Gbar_support_pr_
support s. commit _Gbar_l emma_proof
supports, commit_support_proof
supports.commit_when_proof
supports.committed_proof
supports.discharge_antisymmetry
supports.discharge_dichotomy
supports.discharge_reflexive
supports.discharge_transitive
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supporCs.found_sub_supporg_proof
supports.found_support_proof
supports.in_o_n_support_proof
supports.subset_support_proof
supports.supporg_backup_proof
supports_tcc_proofs.foundation_TCC1_PgOOF
voted_step.main_vote_proof
vo_ed_step.maj_proof
voted_step.rrunto_task_proof
voted_step.rs_ep__ask_proof
vo_ed_step.sensors_nog_voted_proof
vo_ed_step.sstep_task_proof
voted_step.vote_lemma_proof
voted_step.voted_ind_step_proof
voted_step.voted_linkproof
voted_step.voted_step_proof
voted_step_tcc.active_task_TCCl_PgOOF
voged_step_tcc_proofs,rstep_task_TCCl_PROOF
voted_step_tcc_proofs.sstep_task_lemma_TCC1_PROOF
voted_step_tcc_proofs.voted_step_lemma_TCCl_PgOOF
Total: 93
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